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Abstract 
This article offers a critical appraisal of the way in which the EU regulates hedge funds (HFs) in the 
AIFM Directive, and its proposal to regulate the repo markets from which they obtain much of their 
ůĞǀĞƌĂŐĞ ? /ƚ ĂƌŐƵĞƐ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ h ?Ɛ ƐĐŚĞŵĞ ŝƐ ŶŽƚ Ă ƌĂĚŝĐĂů ĚĞƉĂƌƚƵƌĞ ĨƌŽŵ ƚŚĞ ƉƌĞ-crisis market 
liberalist approach, and that its reliance on discretionary intervention is misplaced because it does 
not take account of the fundamental uncertainty that characterises financial markets. The article 
outlines the operations of HFs and explores the extent to which they pose a threat to systemic 
stability, paying particular attention to the use of leverage by HFs. It explores the background to the 
AIFM Directive and the post-crisis international consensus on financial regulation, and then 
evaluates the complex division of responsibility for regulating HFs between the national and 
supranational authorities. Finally, it discusses how HFs should be regulated. Drawing on the work of 
Minsky, it argues that a leverage cap would have been more likely to prevent HFs contributing to 
systemic instability than the scheme adopted. Nor are ƚŚĞƉƌŽƉŽƐĞĚƌƵůĞƐŽŶŵĂŶĚĂƚŽƌǇ ‘ŚĂŝƌĐƵƚƐ ?ŝŶ
ƌĞƉŽ ŵĂƌŬĞƚƐ Žƌ ƚŚĞ /&D ŝƌĞĐƚŝǀĞ ?Ɛ ƌƵůĞƐ ŽŶ ƌĞŵƵŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ likely to prevent HFs contributing to 
systemic instability.  
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Regulating Hedge Funds for Systemic Stability: the h ?ƐƉƉƌŽach* 
 
I Introduction 
This article explores the way the European Union regulates hedge funds (hereafter HFs). Its main 
focus is on the Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive (AIFM Directive),1 and the recent EU 
proposal for a Regulation on Reporting and Transparency of Securities Financing Transactions (SFT 
Regulation).2 The AIFM Directive aims to regulate HFs by regulating their managers, whilst the 
purpose of the SFT Regulation is to create greater transparency in the securities financing  ?Žƌ ‘ƌĞƉŽ ? )
market, which will indirectly regulate hedge funds, because that market is the source of much of the 
leverage that hedge funds use.  
dŚĞĂƌƚŝĐůĞ ?Ɛmain concern is to determine the extent to which European regulation can fulfil what is 
allegedly its main purpose, namely, ensuring that HFs are managed so that they do not become 
sources of instability for the financial system as a whole, i.e. systemic instability. HFs operate on the 
basis of leverage, that is, their investments are financed not only by the capital contributed by their 
investors, but also by borrowed money which supplements that capital. Depending on the strategy 
pursued by individual HF managers, those borrowings can range from one or two times to many 
ŵƵůƚŝƉůĞƐŽĨƚŚĞĨƵŶĚ ?ƐĐĂƉŝƚĂů ?
The instruments discussed in this article recognise that ,&Ɛ ? use of leverage can result in financial 
instability. In particular, the AIFM Directive explicitly justifies its regulation of HF managers by 
ƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƚŽ ‘effective monitoring of systemic risk ? ?3 and states that ,&Ɛ ? use of leverage means that 
ƚŚĞǇ ŵĂǇ ?  ‘under certain conditions Q ĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚĞ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ďƵŝůĚ-up of systemic risk or disorderly 
markets ? ?4 ^ŝŵŝůĂƌůǇ ? ƚŚĞ ^&d ZĞŐƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ŝƐ ŝŶƚĞŶĚĞĚ  ‘ƚŽ ĞŶŚĂŶĐĞ ĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂů ƐƚĂďŝůŝƚǇ ? ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ƚŚĞ
imposition of uniform transparency rules on the securities financing transactions which, inter alia, 
provide hedge funds with much of their leverage.5 But does this acknowledgment of the risks 
inherent in the way HFs operate translate into an effective regulatory framework? 
Many argue that the two legal instruments considered in this article mark a paradigmatic shift, a 
bold intervention which limits the economic freedom of hedge funds, and which will reduce the 
danger that HFs will pose a threat to systemic stability. In particular, it has been claimed that there 
ǁĂƐ ‘ĂŐĞŶƵŝŶĞǁŝůůŝŶŐŶĞƐƐŽŶƚŚĞƉĂƌƚŽĨƌŝƚŝƐŚƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĂŶĚƌĞŐƵůĂƚŽƌǇĐŚŝĞĨƐƚŽĞŶŐĂŐĞŝŶĂƋƵŝƚĞ
ĨƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂůƌĞĂƉƉƌĂŝƐĂůŽĨƚŚĞ^ƚĂƚĞ ?ƐƌŽůĞ ? ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ/&DŝƌĞĐƚŝǀĞŝƐƚŚĞƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŶŽƚŽŶůǇŽĨ
political cŽŵƉƌŽŵŝƐĞ ? ďƵƚ ĂůƐŽ ŽĨ  ‘Ă ƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞĚ ? ŝŶƚĞůůĞĐƚƵĂůůǇ-grounded move away from formerly 
orthodox beliefs in the self-ĐŽƌƌĞĐƚŝŶŐ ĞĨĨĞĐƚƐ ŽĨ ŵĂƌŬĞƚƐ ? ?6 Other observers are more sceptical of 
                                                          
*
 I am grateful to Illka Harju, Trevor Pugh, Jay Cullen, Robert Burrell, the editor of the European Law Journal 
and the anonymous referees for helpful comments, critique and discussions relating to this article. All the 
remaining errors are my own. 
1
Directive 2011/61/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2011 on Alternative 
Investment Fund Managers and amending Directives 2003/41/EC and 2009/65/EC and Regulations (EC) No 
1060/2009 and (EU) No 1095/2010 (OJ L 174/1, 1.7.2011). Agreement was reached on the Directive on 8
th
 June 
2011 and it came into force on 21
st
 July 2011. 
2
 See Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Reporting and Transparency 
of Securities Financing Transactions (COM(2014) 40 final, 29.1.2014) 
3
 AIFM Directive, supra n2, preamble para 88 
4
 Ibid, preamble, Para 49 
5
 SFT Regulation, supra n3, 5 and 6 
6
  ?&ĞƌƌĂŶ ? ‘dŚĞZĞŐƵůĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ,ĞĚŐĞ&ƵŶĚƐĂŶĚWƌŝǀĂƚĞƋƵŝƚǇ PĂƐĞ^ƚƵĚǇŝŶƚŚĞĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞh ?Ɛ
ZĞŐƵůĂƚŽƌǇ ZĞƐƉŽŶƐĞ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ &ŝŶĂŶĐŝĂů ƌŝƐŝƐ ? ?University of Cambridge Faculty of Law Working Paper No 
10/2011 (February 2011), 17. Fioretos offers a similar appraisal of the regulatory regime drawn up by the G20 
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whether there has been a real change of heart on the part of the British authorities, and instead 
claim that the move away from the belief in self-ƌĞŐƵůĂƚŝŶŐĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂůŵĂƌŬĞƚƐƌĞƐƵůƚƐĨƌŽŵ ‘ŵĂƌŬĞƚ-
ƐŚĂƉŝŶŐ ? DĞŵďĞƌ ^ƚĂƚĞƐ ? ƐƵĐŚ ĂƐ &ƌĂŶĐĞ ĂŶĚ 'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ ? ƉƌĞǀĂŝůŝŶŐ ŽǀĞƌ  ‘ŵĂƌŬĞƚ-ŵĂŬŝŶŐ ? DĞŵďĞƌ
States, such as the UK. This new balance of regulatory power has  ‘ƉĂƌƚůǇ ĂĨĨĞĐƚĞĚ Q ŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů
ƌĞŐƵůĂƚŽƌǇĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚĞƐĂŶĚƚŚĞƉƌĞǀĂŝůŝŶŐƉĂƌĂĚŝŐŵŝŶƚŚĞh ? ?ĞǀĞŶƚŚŽƵŐŚŝƚĚŽĞƐŶŽƚĂŵŽƵŶƚƚŽ ‘a 
fully-ĨůĞĚŐĞĚƉĂƌĂĚŝŐŵƐŚŝĨƚ ? ?7  
This article takes a rather different position. It shows that the assumption shared by financial 
economists and financial regulators before the crisis, namely that financial markets can, for the most 
part, be left to regulate themselves, still casts a long shadow over the new European regulatory 
framework.8 That core premise has not been abandoned; it has simply been reformulated and 
presented in a different way. This can be seen clearly from the Turner Review, which has been very 
influential and is widely regarded as highly critical of the pre-crisis orthodoxy. It accepts that 
 ‘ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƚǇ ĚŽĞƐ ŶŽƚ ĞŶƐƵƌĞ ĐŽůůĞĐƚŝǀĞ ƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƚǇ ? ?Yet it still explains the failures in the 
build up to the crisis by ƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƚŽ ‘ĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐŽĨŝŵƉĞƌĨĞĐƚŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ƚŚĞƉĂƵĐŝƚǇŽĨŵĂĐƌŽ-
prudential, systemic- and system-wide analyƐŝƐ ? ?9 This is not an outright rejection of reliance on self-
regulation; it is a plea for a regulatory scheme which will create the conditions under which markets 
can come close to self-regulating. The effect is to reduce the spectacular pre-crisis regulatory failure 
to simple problems of information asymmetry and incomplete regulatory mandates. The AIFM 
Directive and SFT Regulation were written as this  ‘ŵŽĚŝĨŝĞĚ ? international consensus was 
consolidating, and they bear its imprint. Rather than a radical shift in approach, these instruments 
represent a modest adaptation of the previous understanding of how financial markets, and HFs in 
particular, operate and the dangers they pose. The AIFM Directive assumes that financial markets 
are, for the most part, self-equilibrating, with intervention only required in situations where 
regulators can clearly identify a market failure. It is true that, for the first time, the EU requires 
Member States to subject HF managers to direct regulation. However, critically, that direct 
regulation is confined to an incomplete information disclosure regime, coupled with discretionary 
supervisory oversight of their leverage and liquidity management systems. That information will be 
more complete if the SFT Regulation becomes law. However, the regulatory scheme remains firmly 
of a piece with the pre-crisis approach to regulation, albeit with slight modifications to reflect the 
new consensus about why the regulators failed.  
This article also goes beyond earlier contributions to the hedge fund literature by arguing that 
regulators have been given an impossible task, and ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ ƐĐŚĞŵĞ ?Ɛ ĞǆĐůƵƐŝǀĞ reliance on 
discretionary intervention is regrettable. Given the massive efforts at reconfiguring financial 
regulation, this may seem a rather odd point to make. The institutional structures of financial 
regulation have been radically improved. Regulators are now provided with better resources, and 
the competence to regulate has been reallocated in some states. The AIFM Directive and SFT 
Regulation will provide a great deal of information to regulators about the operation and financing 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
in 2009, which, will be shown below, strongly influenced the AIFM Directive, claiming it  ‘ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚƐ ĂŶ
ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚƐŚŝĨƚŝŶŚŽǁƚŚĞǁŽƌůĚ ?ƐůĂƌŐĞĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĞƐƌĞŐƵůĂƚĞƚŚĞƉƌƵĚĞŶƚŝĂůƌŝƐŬƐĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚĞĚǁŝƚŚŚĞĚŐĞĨƵŶĚƐ ? ?
See O. &ŝŽƌĞƚŽƐ ?  ‘ĂƉŝƚĂůŝƐƚ ŝǀĞƌƐŝƚǇ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ /ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů ZĞŐƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ,ĞĚŐĞ &ƵŶĚƐ ?  ? ? ? ? ? )  ? ?Review of 
International Political Economy 696, 700.  
7
 > ?YƵĂŐůŝĂ ? ‘dŚĞ ?KůĚ ?ĂŶĚ “EĞǁ ?WŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĐŽŶŽŵǇŽĨ,ĞĚŐĞ&ƵŶĚZĞŐƵůĂƚŝŽŶŝŶƚŚĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶhŶŝŽŶ ? ? ? ? ? ? )
34(4) West European Politics 665, 678 
8
 See FSA, The Turner Review: A regulatory response to the global banking crisis (March 2009), 40 and 87. Lord 
Turner, who took over as Chairman of the h< ?ƐFinancial Services Authority (FSA) in September 2008, notes 
this tendency in financial markets theory, and admits that the FSA adopted Ă ‘ƐŽŵĞƚŝŵĞƐŝŵƉůŝĐŝƚďƵƚĂƚƚŝŵĞƐ
ƋƵŝƚĞŽǀĞƌƚƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ?ƚŚĂƚŵĂƌŬĞƚƐ ‘are in general self correcting, with market discipline a more effective tool 
than regulation or supervisory oversight through which to ensure thaƚ ĨŝƌŵƐ ? ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĞƐ ĂƌĞ ƐŽƵŶĚ ĂŶĚ ƌŝƐŬƐ
ĐŽŶƚĂŝŶĞĚ ? ?
9
 Ibid, 40-1 and 87.  
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ŽĨ ,&Ɛ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƌĞƉŽŵĂƌŬĞƚ ? DŽƌĞŽǀĞƌ ? ƚŚĞ ‘ŵĂĐƌŽ ? ĚŝŵĞŶƐŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƌĞŐƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ŚĂƐ
been rediscovered. Regulators have been instructed to focus on macro-prudential matters 
(essentially systemic stability) as well as the microprudential matters (essentially the stability of 
individual financial institutions), which were their principal focus before the crisis. The EU has 
established the European Systemic Risk Board with explicit responsibilities for monitoring systemic 
risk.10 There is more international cooperation under the aegis of the G20.  
All these are welcome changes. Still, it remains the case that no regulator identified that the build-up 
of leverage before the crisis posed a threat to the stability of the financial system. Would regulators 
have done better if the new norms had been in force in, say, 2005? Only if their catastrophic failure 
was caused by the lack of appropriate information and the lack of a mandate to take care of macro-
prudential stability. But were these the real causes of the regulatory failure?  
Drawing on the work of Minsky, the article claims that the future evolution of the financial system, 
in which positions in assets are financed using leverage, is fundamentally uncertain. The implication 
of this is that the AIFM Directive gives regulators powers that they are unlikely to be able (and 
willing) to exercise. Even if they can overcome political pressures and lobbying, regulators will have 
ŶŽŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞďĂƐŝƐŽŶǁŚŝĐŚƚŽũƵƐƚŝĨǇŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƚŝŽŶƐŝŶ,&Ɛ ?ĂĨĨĂŝƌƐŝŶ the name of systemic stability. 
Instead, it would have been preferable, as the first draft of the AIFM Directive proposed, to opt for a 
different regulatory model, which would have represented a clear break with the underlying 
understanding of how financial markets, and specifically hedge funds, operate. It would have 
imposed a clear cap on the leverage of HFs, with discretionary regulation playing a complementary 
(and thus secondary) role. However, this proposal was unacceptable to the HF industry and the UK 
government and never became law. 
The article is structured as follows. The next section briefly outlines the activities of hedge funds and 
the operation of the repo market, from which HFs obtain much of their leverage. The third section 
then explores the heated debate about whether hedge funds pose a threat to systemic stability, 
which formed a backdrop to the negotiation of the AIFM Directive. The fourth section explores the 
legislative background to the AIFM Directive, and explores the division of regulatory competence 
between the EU and the Member States, paying particular attention to the regulation of leverage. 
The fifth section explores the normative question of how HFs should be regulated, and evaluates the 
likely efficacy of ƚŚĞ h ?Ɛ instruments in preventing HFs contributing to financial instability in the 
future. A brief conclusion follows.  
 
II A Brief Outline of Hedge Funds and the Repo Market 
It is difficult to make generalisations about HFs ďĞĐĂƵƐĞƚŚĞƌĞŝƐ ‘ŶŽƵŶŝǀĞƌƐĂůůǇĂĐĐĞƉƚĞĚĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶ ?,
ĂůƚŚŽƵŐŚ ƚŚĞ ƚĞƌŵ ŐĞŶĞƌĂůůǇ ƌĞĨĞƌƐ ƚŽ  ‘ĂŶǇ ƉŽŽůĞĚ ŝŶǀĞƐƚŵĞŶƚ ǀĞŚŝĐůĞ ƚŚĂƚ ŝƐ ƉƌŝǀĂƚĞůǇ ŽƌŐĂŶŝǌĞĚ ?
administered by professional managers, and not widely available to the ƉƵďůŝĐ ? ?11 HFs have very 
broad freedom to choose their investments, and they can invest in  ‘ĞƋƵŝƚǇ ? ĚĞďƚ ǁŝƚŚ ĞƋƵŝƚǇ ůŝŬĞ
ĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐƚŝĐƐ ?ĚĞďƚ ?ƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞĚƉƌŽĚƵĐƚƐĂŶĚĚĞƌŝǀĂƚŝǀĞƐ ? ?12 By purchasing derivatives, HFs can profit 
from both rises (through long positions) and falls (through short positions) in the prices of stocks, 
corporate and sovereign debt, currencies and other assets.  
                                                          
10
 Regulation 1092/2010 of 24 November 2010 on European Union macro-prudential oversight of the financial 
system and establishing a European Systemic Risk Board, Art 3(1).   
11
 FinancŝĂů^ƚĂďŝůŝƚǇ&ŽƌƵŵ ? ‘ZĞƉŽƌƚŝŶŐŽĨƚŚĞtŽƌŬŝŶŐ'ƌŽƵƉŽŶ,ŝŐŚůǇ>ĞǀĞƌĂŐĞĚ/ŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?Ɖƌŝů ? ? ? ? ), 8, 
ĐŝƚŝŶŐƚŚĞh^WƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚ ?Ɛ ‘tŽƌŬŝŶŐ'ƌŽƵƉŽŶ&ŝŶĂŶĐŝĂůDĂƌŬĞƚƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? 
12
 FSA,  ‘WƌŝǀĂƚĞ ƋƵŝƚǇ P  ŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶ ŽĨ ZŝƐŬ ĂŶĚ ZĞŐƵůĂƚŽƌǇ ŶŐĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ ? ?Financial Services Authority 
Discussion Paper 06/06 (November 2006), 3.64. 
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It is commonly argued that HFs perform socially valuable activities. They create positive externalities 
for the financial sysƚĞŵ ďǇ ĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŝŶŐ ƚŽ  ‘ŵŽƌĞ ĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚ ĂŶĚ ůŝƋƵŝĚ ŵĂƌŬĞƚƐ ? ? ďǇ ĂƐƐŝƐƚŝŶŐ ƉƌŝĐĞ
discovery through their arbitrage activities and even by purchasing assets in a crisis when other 
funds are having to liquidate in order to comply with their mandate.13 HFs which take an activist role 
in corporate governance create pressure on managers to maximise shareholder value and have the 
potential to close the gap between  ‘ownership ? and control.14  
HFs are normally domiciled in offshore locations,15 but their managers are established onshore, most 
commonly, amongst EU Member States, in the United Kingdom. This is why the AIFM Directive 
regulates the managers of HFs (AIFMs) rather than the funds themselves. Under their fee structure, 
the AIFM is typically paid an annual management fee of 1-2% of capital committed, and as general 
ƉĂƌƚŶĞƌŝŶƚŚĞĨƵŶĚƌĞĐĞŝǀĞƐ ‘ĐĂƌƌŝĞĚŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚ ?ŽĨĂƌŽƵŶĚ ? ?A?ŽĨƚŚĞĐĂƉŝƚĂůŐĂŝŶƐŵĂĚĞďǇƚŚĞĨƵŶĚ ?
ŶŽƌŵĂůůǇ ŽŶĐĞ Ă ŐŝǀĞŶ  ‘ŚƵƌĚůĞ ? ƌĂƚĞ ŽĨ ƌĞƚƵƌŶ ŚĂƐ ďĞĞŶ ƉĂƐƐĞĚ ? ,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ? ƚŚĞƐĞ  ‘ŚƵƌĚůĞƐ ? ĂƌĞ ŶŽƚ
uniformly imposed. HFs do not have a fixed life span, and investments are liquid, with investors 
normally able to give notice to withdraw their investment (although notice periods are getting 
longer and capital structures are becoming more varied). Traditionally, therefore, HFs matched their 
liabilities by taking shorter term positions in more liquid assets, although funds which lock their 
investors in for longer periods now also invest in less liquid assets. 
As well as using the capital provided by their investors, HFs also use leverage (that is, borrowed 
money) to increase their exposure to their positions. HF leverage takes two main forms: financial 
and synthetic leverage.  
Financial leverage appears on balance sheets, and most HFs make only limited use of it, being much 
less highly levered than banks.16 Hedge funds obtain financial leverage through secured and 
unsecured lending, from prime brokers and from repo markets. Prime brokers are the largest 
investment banks, and, in addition to finance, they also provide HFs with  ‘ƌŝƐŬŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐ ?
ĞǆĞĐƵƚŝŽŶ ?ĐƵƐƚŽĚǇ ?ĚĂŝůǇĂĐĐŽƵŶƚƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚƐ ?ĂŶĚƐŚŽƌƚƐĂůĞŝŶǀĞŶƚŽƌǇĨŽƌƐƚŽĐŬďŽƌƌŽǁŝŶŐ ? ?17 Repo 
markets allow financial institutions such as HFs to obtain short term credit against collateral such as 
bonds and stocks, and allow risk averse financial institutions to make short-term secured loans.18 A 
repo is Ă ‘ƌĞƉƵƌĐŚĂƐĞĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚ ? ?ƚŚĂƚŝƐ ?the sale of an asset, say a bond, with an agreement that 
the seller will repurchase after a specified time period for a specified price. The seller (here, a hedge 
fund) wants to borrow, whilst the buyer (such as a money market mutual fund, insurance company, 
corporation, central bank or commercial bank) has surplus money which they want to lend out. The 
sale price will be at a disĐŽƵŶƚ ?ŬŶŽǁŶĂƐĂ ‘ŚĂŝƌĐƵƚ ? )ƚŽƚŚĞŵĂƌŬĞƚƉƌŝĐĞƚŽƉƌŽƚĞĐƚƚŚĞďƵǇĞƌĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ
market fluctuations, while the repurchase price will be higher to include interest (at a rate known as 
ƚŚĞ ‘ƌĞƉŽƌĂƚĞ ? )ĨŽƌƚŚĞduration of the repo. The most common repo lasts one day, although it can 
normally be rolled over, so a one-day repo may last for several months. In form a repo is a sale, but 
in substance it is secured lending, and it enables risk averse institutions to lend out their money 
safely. For accounting purposes, the asset which is used as collateral remains on the balance sheet of 
the borrower (the seller of the asset), although the repo shows up as leverage on the balance sheet 
(with the money borrowed showing up as an asset balanced by a liability to repay). Hedge funds use 
short-term repos to fund longer-term positions in financial assets, and so engage in maturity 
                                                          
13
J. Daníelsson, A. Taylor and J-P. Zigrand, 'Highwaymen or heroes: Should hedge funds be regulated? A survey' 
(2005) 1 Journal of Financial Stability 522, 523.  
14
 W. BratƚŽŶ ? ‘,ĞĚŐĞ&ƵŶĚƐĂŶĚ'ŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞdĂƌŐĞƚƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ?Georgetown Law Journal 1375, 1380-1381. 
15
 The Financial Conduct Authority reported that 67% of HFs that responded to its March 2014 survey were 
domiciled in the Cayman Islands. 
16
 Daníelsson, Taylor and Zigrand, op cit 529 supra n13. 
17
 A Ang, S Gorovyy and G van Inwegen, 'Hedge Fund Leverage' (2011) NBER Working Paper 16081, 5 fn 5. 
18
 They are also one of the essential mechanisms by which central banks carry out monetary policy, injecting 
reserves or bonds into the markets in order to ensure their target interest rate is met. 
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transformation in a similar way to banks. Counterparties to repo transactions, including banks, 
ĨƌĞƋƵĞŶƚůǇ ‘ƌĞŚǇƉŽƚŚĞĐĂƚĞ ?ƚŚĞĐŽůůĂƚĞƌĂů ?that is, they repo it for cash. 19  Hence the same asset can 
collateralise a chain of loans, vastly increasing liquidity, ďƵƚ ĂůƐŽ ĂůůŽǁŝŶŐ Ă  ‘ďƵŝůĚ-up of hidden 
ůĞǀĞƌĂŐĞĂŶĚŝŶƚĞƌĐŽŶŶĞĐƚĞĚŶĞƐƐŝŶƚŚĞƐǇƐƚĞŵ ?.20 A ,& ?Ɛ access to repo leverage is limited only by 
the  ‘ŚĂŝƌĐƵƚ ?ŝŵƉŽƐĞĚby the buyer (the lender) on the asset sold by the HF (the borrower). Haircuts 
are the difference between the market price of the asset at the time of the transaction and the 
amount the lender is willing to lend against the asset, and have to be funded out of ƚŚĞďŽƌƌŽǁĞƌ ?Ɛ
equity capital.21 Breuer notes that, ƐŝŶĐĞ  ‘haircuts on repos are typically between 1 and 2 percent, 
ůĞǀĞƌĂŐĞƵƐŝŶŐŵƵůƚŝƉůĞƌĞƉŽƐĐĂŶƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůůǇďĞŚƵŐĞ ? ?22 The Financial Stability Board (FSB)23 recently 
published a framework of minimum haircuts for repo transactions, but this excludes government 
bonds and repos to which neither party is a bank. This is discussed below. 
Synthetic leverage is embedded in a derivative contract, and so is taken on at the level of a financial 
instrument rather than by an investor.24 As such, it ĚŽĞƐŶŽƚĂƉƉĞĂƌŽŶƚŚĞ,& ?ƐďĂůĂŶĐĞƐŚĞĞƚ.25 It 
implies that the investor may make gains or losses which considerably exceed their initial investment 
in the derivative. Before the introduction of the AIFM Directive, HFs did not, for the most part, 
report on this type of leverage.26  
HF leverage is highly problematic from a regulatory perspective. Being based in low tax, low 
regulation jurisdictions, HFs do not publicly disclose their balance sheets, making it impossible for 
ƌĞŐƵůĂƚŽƌƐƚŽŽďƚĂŝŶĂĐůĞĂƌƉŝĐƚƵƌĞŽĨƚŚĞĞǆƚĞŶƚŽĨĂ,& ?ƐĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂůůĞǀĞƌĂŐĞ ?ƚƉƌĞƐĞŶƚ ?ŶŽĨŽƌŵĂů
measures of the size of the repo market are maintained, but the daily amount outstanding on the US 
repo markets was estimated at between US$3 and 10 trn in 2012,27 while the Euro repo market was 
ĞƐƚŝŵĂƚĞĚ Ăƚ  ? ? ƚƌŶ ŝŶ  ? ? ? ? ?28 It is unclear how much repo borrowing is attributable to HFs. The 
Financial Times reported in 2014 that HFs are taking up a larger share of the market, but that the 
market has been shrinking since 2008 as a result of changes to banking regulation and a shortage of 
                                                          
19
 Rehypothecation refers to the practice whereby a lender under a repo transaction enters into another repo 
transaction as a borrower, using the asset they received in the first repo transaction as the security for their 
borrowing in the second transaction.  
20
 See COM(2014) 40 final at 3. 
21
 See M Brunnermeier and others, 'The Fundamental Principles of Financial Regulation' (2009) Geneva Reports 
on the World Economy 11, 14. 
22
 W ? ƌĞƵĞƌ ?  ‘DĞĂƐƵƌŝŶŐ KĨĨ-Balance-^ŚĞĞƚ >ĞǀĞƌĂŐĞ ? ?IMF Working Paper WP/00/202, at 18. Similarly, the 
KŶŽƚĞƐƚŚĂƚ ‘Depending on the size of the haircut, traders could easily establish a $1 billion position in a 
given security with only $10 million in capital. ? ^ĞĞ K ?  ‘Hedge Funds, Highly Leveraged Investment 
Strategies and Financial Markets ? (1999) 73 Financial Market Trends 27, 42. 
23
 The Financial Stability Board (formerly the Financial Stability Forum) is an international body which monitors 
and makes recommendations about the global financial system. Its members are national central banks, 
treasuries and financial market regulators. 
24
  ‘ŵďĞĚĚĞĚ ůĞǀĞƌĂŐĞ ƌĞĨĞƌƐ ƚŽ ŚŽůĚŝŶg a position that is itself leveraged. A simple example is a minority 
investment held by a bank in an equity fund that is itself funded by loans. While critical for the stability of the 
financial institutions and of the financial system, embedded leverage ŝƐ ĞǆƚƌĞŵĞůǇ ĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚ ƚŽ ŵĞĂƐƵƌĞ ? ? ^ĞĞ
The World Bank Group Financial Sector & Financial Sector Development Vice-WƌĞƐŝĚĞŶĐǇ ? ‘dŚĞ>ĞǀĞƌĂŐĞZĂƚŝŽ P
EĞǁŝŶĚŝŶŐ>ŝŵŝƚŽŶĂŶŬƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ?EŽƚĞ ? ?ĂǀĂŝůĂďůĞĂƚ 
http://www.worldbank.org/financialcrisis/pdf/levrage-ratio-web.pdf 
25
 See eg D Stowell, Investment Banks, Hedge Funds, and Private Equity (2nd edn Elsevier, 2012) at 287.  
26
 Reserve Bank of Australia, The Impact of Hedge Funds on Financial Markets, June 1999 at 5. An important 
ĞǆĐĞƉƚŝŽŶ ?ĚŝƐĐƵƐƐĞĚďĞůŽǁ ?ǁĂƐƚŚĞ& ?ƐĂŶŶƵĂů W but voluntary  W Hedge Fund Survey. 
27
 ^ĞĞ  ? ŽƉĞůĂŶĚ Ğƚ Ăů ?  ‘Mapping and Sizing the U.S. Repo Market ? ? >ŝďĞƌƚǇ ^ƚƌĞĞƚ ĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƐ ůŽŐ
(http://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2012/06/mapping-and-sizing-the-us-repo-market.html) 
28
 Reuters,  ‘ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ ƌĞƉŽ ŵĂƌŬĞƚ ŐƌŽǁƐ ƚŽ ƌĞĐŽƌĚ  ? ƚƌůŶ ĞƵƌŽƐ ? ?  ? ?^ĞƉƚĞŵďĞƌ  ? ? ? ? 
(http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/09/15/markets-money-repo-idUSLDE68E0PI20100915) 
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collateral.29 Synthetic leverage is even harder to estimate ďĞĐĂƵƐĞŽĨ ‘ƚŚĞĂďƐĞŶĐĞŽĨŵĞƚŚŽĚŽůŽŐŝĐĂů
ĐŽŶƐŝƐƚĞŶĐǇ ŝŶ ƚĞƌŵƐ ŽĨ ŚŽǁ ůĞǀĞƌĂŐĞ ŝƐŵĞĂƐƵƌĞĚ ĂŶĚ ƌĞƉŽƌƚĞĚ ? ?30 The implication of this is that, 
once synthetic leverage (which does not appear on balance sheets) is taken into account, hedge 
funds ŚĂǀĞ ‘ŵƵĐŚŚŝŐŚĞƌůĞǀĞƌĂŐĞƚŚĂŶƚŚĞĐŽŵŵŽŶůǇƋƵŽƚĞĚĨŝŐƵƌĞƐ ? ?31  
The best publicly available evidence about the sources and extent of HF leverage comes from the 
h< ?Ɛ&ŝŶĂŶĐŝal Conduct Authority (FCA), which, like its predecessor, the FSA, carries out an annual 
survey of HFs. HFs which choose to participate disclose the extent and sources of their leverage. In 
its March 2014 Hedge Fund Survey, the FCA reported that only 2% of ŚĞĚŐĞĨƵŶĚƐ ? ůĞǀĞƌĂŐĞ came 
from financial leverage, while 98% came from synthetic leverage.32 The enormous synthetic leverage 
figure (US$ 22,296 billion) can be, at least in large part, explained by the fact that this is gross rather 
than net notional exposure, and is concentrated in a handful of hedge funds.33 These astonishing 
synthetic leverage figures should not obscure the fact that repo is a very important source of HF 
leverage: the 2% contribution of financial leverage still amounted to some US$791 billion. In 2012, 
the FSA reported that around 20% of HF leverage came from prime broker borrowing and 47% of HF 
leverage came from repo. That figure was down from 57% in September 2011, but has been 
consistently above 40% since 2009.34 Nor should it obscure the concentration of repo borrowings in 
a relatively small group of HFs. dŚĞ& ?Ɛdata ŽŶ ‘ĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂůůĞǀĞƌĂŐĞ ?ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƐƚŚĂƚ, in 2014, ƚŚĞ ‘ƚŽƉ
ƚĞŶ ĨƵŶĚƐ  ?ŝŶ ďŽƌƌŽǁŝŶŐ ĂŵŽƵŶƚƐ ) ŵĂĚĞ ƵƉ  ? ?A? ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƚŽƚĂů ĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂů ďŽƌƌŽǁŝŶŐƐ ƌĞƉŽƌƚĞĚ ? ? tŝƚŚ
mean collateralized borrowing through repo by hedge funds estimated by the FCA to be around 
US$2.75bn, this suggests that the most financially leveraged funds have leverage of many multiples 
of this amount.35 These patterns were largely replicated in the June 2015 Hedge Fund Survey, with 
the FCA reporting that 43.9% of HFs used repo, whilst 69.7% obtained leverage from their prime 
broker ?ďƵƚŶŽƚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚ ‘ƐŝŶŐůĞoutlier funds make heavy use of repos and reverse repos. ?36 Each year 
the FCA reports that  ‘the majority of hedge fƵŶĚƐƚĞŶĚƚŽƵƐĞƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞůǇůŽǁůĞǀĞůƐŽĨůĞǀĞƌĂŐĞ ? ?37  
The pattern which emerges from this inevitably incomplete data is one of considerable 
concentration of leverage and risk, with relatively few HFs responsible for the vast bulk of the 
leverage. The disclosure required under the AIFM Directive will give regulators a far better idea of 
the leverage taken on by individual HFs, and if the proposed SFT Regulation becomes law, regulators 
will be able to gain a much better idea of the size and concentration of the repo market. However, as 
this article argues, providing regulators with fuller information about the extent and concentration 
                                                          
29
  ‘ŝŐŝŶǀĞƐƚŽƌƐƌĞƉůĂĐĞďĂŶŬƐŝŶ ? ? ? ?ƚŶƌĞƉŽŵĂƌŬĞƚ ? ?Financial Times, 29th May 2014. 
30
 D. Awrey, 'The Limits of EU Hedge Fund Regulation' (2011) 5 Law and Financial Markets Review 119, 125 fn 
11.  
31
 Reserve Bank of Australia, op cit 6 supra n26. The Financial Stability Forum noted in 2000 that assessing 
leverage purely on an on-ďĂůĂŶĐĞƐŚĞĞƚďĂƐŝƐ ‘may understate risk because it does not take into account off-
balance-ƐŚĞĞƚƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƐǁŚŝĐŚŵĂǇĂŵƉůŝĨǇƚŚĞ ĨƵŶĚ ?ƐŵĂƌŬĞƚƌŝƐŬĞǆƉŽƐƵƌĞ ? ?^ĞĞ&^& ?Report of the Working 
Group on Highly Leveraged Institutions (April 2000), Annex D, 86.  
32
 FCA, Hedge Fund Survey, March 2014, 18 
33
 Ibid, 22. As the Survey reports ?  ‘Most of the synthetic exposure is generated by a few funds ? ?ǁŝƚŚ  ? ?HFs 
accounting for 87% of the gross notional exposure. The hedge funds using high gross synthetic leverage are 
ƉƵƌƐƵŝŶŐ  ‘ƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞ ǀĂůƵĞ ? ĂŶĚ ŵĂĐƌŽ ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĞƐ ? Ɛ ƚŚĞ & ŶŽƚĞƐ ŝŶ ŝƚƐ  ? ? ? ? ^ƵƌǀĞǇ Ăƚ  ? ? ? ,&Ɛ  ‘use risk 
management techniques to net out directional exposures ?ďƵƚƚŚŝƐ  ‘ĚŽĞƐŶŽƚƌĞĚƵĐĞƚŚĞŽǀĞƌĂůůŐƌŽƐƐƐŝǌĞŽĨ
the positions they are taking in the markets, which constŝƚƵƚĞƐƚŚĞŝƌŵĂƌŬĞƚĨŽŽƚƉƌŝŶƚ ? ? 
34
 See FSA, Assessing the possible sources of systemic risk from hedge funds: A report on the findings of the  
&^ ?Ɛ ,ĞĚŐĞ &ƵŶĚ ^ƵƌǀĞǇ ĂŶĚ ,ĞĚŐĞ &ƵŶĚ ĂƐ ŽƵŶƚĞƌƉĂƌƚǇ ^ƵƌǀĞǇ, August 2012, 12. Synthetic leverage, 
presumably measured on a net basis, accounted for the balance. 
35
 FCA, Hedge Fund Survey, March 2014, 26. 
36
 FCA, Hedge Fund Survey, June 2015, 21. A similar pattern emerges in relation to synthetic leverage, with the 
top 10 funds accounting for 64% of gross leverage. 
37
 See FSA Assessing the possible sources of systemic risk, op cit supra n34, and FCA Hedge Fund Surveys 2014 
and 2015. 
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of leverage is not the same as equipping them to know when to intervene to prevent systemic 
instability. 
 
III Hedge Funds and Systemic Stability 
Whether HFs contributed to the financial crisis, and whether their operations can pose a threat to 
the stability of the financial system, are highly contested questions. ZŽŵĂŶŽ ĂƌŐƵĞƐ  ‘ƚŚĞƌĞ ŝƐ ĂŶ
absence of evidence pointing to hedge fuŶĚƐĂƐĂĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŝŶŐĨĂĐƚŽƌŝŶƚŚĞƌĞĐĞŶƚĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂůƉĂŶŝĐ ? ?38 
Stromqvist claims ƚŚĂƚ  ‘ƚŚĞĐƌŝƐŝƐŚĂƐĂĨĨĞĐƚĞĚƚŚĞŵŵŽƌĞƚŚĂŶƚŚĞǇŚĂǀĞĂĨĨĞĐƚĞĚƚŚĞĐƌŝƐŝƐ ?39 and 
ƚŚĂƚ  ‘ƚŚĞstrongest argument for the claim that hedge funds have not driven the current financial 
crisis is that they have been negatively affected on a broad front ? ?40 In contrast, the De Larosière 
Report noted that ŚĞƌĚŝŶŐĂŵŽŶŐ,&ƐĂŶĚŵĂƌŐŝŶĐĂůůƐ  ‘intensified liquidity problems ?.41 However, 
ďĞǇŽŶĚ ƚŚŝƐ  ‘ƚƌĂŶƐŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ ĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶ ? ? ŝƚ ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ  ‘they did not play a major role in the 
emergence of the crisis ? ? 42 Similarly, the Turner Review concluded that simultaneous deleveraging by 
ŵĂŶǇ,&Ɛ ‘may well have played an important role over the last six months in depressing securities 
prices in a self-fulfilling cycle. ?43 In summary, &ĞƌƌĂŶ ƐĂǇƐ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ  ‘ƌĞĐĞŝǀĞĚ ǁŝƐĚŽŵ ? ŝƐ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞǇ
amplified the consequences of the financial crisis. 44 
On the broader question of the systemic stability implications of HFs, Stromqvist argues that HFs 
pose no greater threat in terms of herding than other institutional investors.45 Certainly, the threat 
posed by asset managers more generally to systemic stability is currently receiving greater 
regulatory scrutiny.46 Similarly, the European Economic and Social Committee concluded in its own 
ŝŶŝƚŝĂƚŝǀĞ ƌĞƉŽƌƚ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ ĂůůĞŐĞĚ  ‘ůĞǀĞƌĂŐĞ ?ƐǇƐƚĞŵ ƌŝƐŬƐ ? ƚŚƌĞĂƚ posed by HFs ǁĂƐ  ‘ŶŽƚ ƉƌŽǀĞŶ ?.47 
However, the G20 Working Group recognised ƚŚĂƚ  ‘WƌŝǀĂƚĞƉŽŽůƐŽĨĐĂƉŝƚĂů ? ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐŚĞĚŐĞ ĨƵŶĚƐ ?
can be a source of risk owing to their combined size in the market, their use of leverage and maturity 
mismatches, and their connectedness with other parts of the financial system. ?48 Likewise, the De 
Larosière Report noted that  ‘hedge funds can add to the leverage of the system and, given the scale 
                                                          
38
 R. RŽŵĂŶŽ ?  ‘Against Financial Regulation Harmonization: A Comment ?(2010) Yale Law & Economics 
Research Paper No. 414 at 3 (Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1697348).  
39
 M. ^ƚƌŽŵƋǀŝƐƚ ? ‘,ĞĚŐĞ&ƵŶĚƐĂŶĚ&ŝŶĂŶĐŝĂůƌŝƐĞƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? )Economic Review of the Sveriges Riksbank 87, 97. 
40
 Ibid, 104. 
41
 Report of the High Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU, Chaired by Jacques de Larosière, 25 
February 2009, Brussels, 12. 
42
 Ibid, 24. 
43
 Turner Review, op cit 72 supra n9. 
44
 &ĞƌƌĂŶ ? ‘ZĞŐƵůĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ,ĞĚŐĞ&ƵŶĚƐ ? ?ŽƉĐŝƚ ?-10 supra n6. 
45
 ^ƚƌŽŵƋǀŝƐƚ ? ‘,ĞĚŐĞ&ƵŶĚƐ ? ?ŽƉĐŝƚ ? ? ?ƐƵƉƌĂŶ39. 
46
 The financial stability implications of so ĐĂůůĞĚ ‘ƉůĂŝŶǀĂŶŝůůĂ ? ?ŶŽŶ-leveraged asset managers have also come 
under scrutiny recently. Whilst these funds frequently have a regulatory cap on their leverage (including 
embedded leverage), and so present a low solvency risk, policy-makers have flagged their potential to become 
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Global Financial Stability Report, April 2015, Chapter 3 at 96- ?ĂŶĚ ? ? ? ? ‘dŚĞƐƐĞƚDĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ/ŶĚƵƐƚƌǇĂŶĚ
&ŝŶĂŶĐŝĂů^ƚĂďŝůŝƚǇ ? ) ? 
47
  ‘dŚĞ ŝŵƉĂĐƚŽĨƉƌŝǀĂƚĞ ĞƋƵŝƚǇ ?ŚĞĚŐĞĂŶĚƐŽǀĞƌĞŝŐŶ ĨƵŶĚƐŽŶ ŝŶĚƵƐƚƌŝĂů ĐŚĂŶŐĞ ŝŶƵƌŽƉĞ ? ?KƉŝŶŝŽŶŽĨ ƚŚĞ
European Economic and Social Committee (own-initiative opinion) (2010/C 128/10) OJ C128/56, 18.5.2010 at 
62. That report ?ƌĞůǇŝŶŐŚĞĂǀŝůǇŽŶ^ƚƌŽŵƋǀŝƐƚ ?Ɛanalysis (op cit supra n39), ĐŽŶĐůƵĚĞĚƚŚĂƚŝƚŝƐ ‘ůŝŬĞůǇƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇ
ƉůĂǇĞĚĂƌŽůĞŝŶƚŚĞĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞĐƌŝƐŝƐ ?ĂůŽŶŐǁŝƚŚĂůůŽĨƚŚĞŽƚŚĞƌŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůŝŶǀĞƐƚŽƌƐ ? ?
48
 G20 Working Group, Enhancing Sound Regulation and Strengthening Transparency, Final Report, March 25, 
2009, Recommendation 10. 
9 
 
at which they can operate, should a problem arise, the concentrated unwinding of their positions 
ĐŽƵůĚĐĂƵƐĞŵĂũŽƌĚŝƐůŽĐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?49  
 
A more detailed account of the ways in which HFs potentially threaten the stability of the financial 
system can be found in thĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ ?Ɛ/ŵƉĂĐƚssessment of the AIFM Directive,50 the 
2010 Report of the Joint Forum,51 and a 2012 report by the h< ?Ɛ&^.52 Those reports draw a useful 
distinction between two channels through which hedge funds might contribute to systemic 
iŶƐƚĂďŝůŝƚǇ PƚŚĞ ‘ŵĂƌŬĞƚĐŚĂŶŶĞů ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞ ‘ĐƌĞĚŝƚĐŚĂŶŶĞů ? ?53  
 
HFs can affect systemic stability through ƚŚĞ ‘ŵĂƌŬĞƚĐŚĂŶŶĞů ? because they borrow money to fund 
positions in assets, causing asset prices to rise, encouraging others to borrow money and enter the 
market, which drives further price rises and further leverage and so on. Once this process goes into 
reverse, hedge funds have to sell assets to pay down debt, and asset prices can fall dramatically. In 
this account, leveraged funds have a procyclical effect, bidding up asset prices during credit 
ĞǆƉĂŶƐŝŽŶƐ ?ĂŶĚĚƌŝǀŝŶŐƚŚĞŵĚŽǁŶƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ‘ĨŝƌĞƐĂůĞ ?ůŝƋƵŝĚĂƚŝŽŶƐĚƵƌŝŶŐĐƌĞĚŝƚĐŽŶƚƌĂĐƚŝŽŶƐ ?54 The 
FSB ŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĞĚĐƌĞĚŝƚŚĞĚŐĞĨƵŶĚƐ ‘that leverage themselves with short-term funding from banks or 
securities leŶĚŝŶŐ ĂŶĚ ƌĞƉŽƐ ? ĂŵŽŶŐ ƚŚĞ ĞŶƚŝƚŝĞƐ ƚŚĂƚ  ‘ĐƌĞĂƚĞ ƚŚĞ ƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂů ĨŽƌ  “ƌƵŶƐ ? ďǇ ƚŚĞŝƌ
ŝŶǀĞƐƚŽƌƐ ?ĐƌĞĚŝƚŽƌƐĂŶĚ ?ŽƌĐŽƵŶƚĞƌƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ? ?ŐĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŶŐ ‘ĐŽŶƚĂŐŝŽŶƌŝƐŬ ? ? ‘ŚĞŝŐŚƚĞŶ ?ŝŶŐ ?ƉƌŽĐǇĐůŝĐĂůŝƚǇ ?
ĂŶĚ ĂŵƉůŝĨǇŝŶŐ  ‘ƐǇƐƚĞŵŝĐ ƌŝƐŬ ? ?55 Although repos are normally rolled over, their short-term nature 
makes the market vulnerable to shifts in sentiment. Sudden dislocations in financial markets may 
result in repos not being rolled over as expected, forcing liquidations and causing lenders to raise the 
ŚĂŝƌĐƵƚŽŶƌĞƉŽ ?ĚĂƐƐĞƚƐ, which may force other hedge funds to liquidate their positions, triggering a 
vicious cycle of haircuts and liquidations. As the repo machinery goes into reverse and asset prices 
fall, HFs can be exposed to failure because the collateral for each loan comes up short, leading to 
ůŽƐƐĞƐ ŽŶ ĞǀĞƌǇ ƌĞƉŽ ƚƌĂŶƐĂĐƚŝŽŶ ? ƉƌŽŐƌĞƐƐŝǀĞůǇ ĞƌŽĚŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ĨƵŶĚ ?Ɛ ĞƋƵŝƚǇ ĐĂƉŝƚĂů ?56 dŚĞ  ‘ŵĂƌŬĞƚ
ĐŚĂŶŶĞů ?ďĞĐŽŵĞƐĂƉƵďůŝĐƉŽůŝĐǇĐŽŶĐĞƌŶŶŽƚďĞĐĂƵƐĞŽĨƚŚĞĨĂŝůƵƌĞŽĨƚŚĞŚĞĚŐĞĨƵŶĚ ?ǁŚŝĐŚ ŝƐĂ
matter for its investors, but because of its impact on asset prices (and from there to the solvency of 
other market participants and financial institutions). 
 
HFs might also create systemic instability through thĞ ‘ĐƌĞĚŝƚĐŚĂŶŶĞů ? if they fail and default on their 
obligations to counterparties which  ‘ƐǇƐƚĞŵŝĐĂůůǇ ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚ ? ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ƐĞŶƐĞ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞŝƌ ĨĂŝůƵƌĞ ǁŽƵůĚ
destabilise the entire financial system. A small number of banks act as prime brokers to HFs, which, 
                                                          
49
 De Larosière Report, op cit para 87 supra n41. The Turner Review flags up ƚŚĞƉŽƐƐŝďŝůŝƚǇ ‘ƚŚĂƚŚĞĚŐĞĨƵŶĚƐ
could evolve in future years, in their scale, their leverage, and their customer promises, in a way which made 
them more bank-ůŝŬĞĂŶĚŵŽƌĞƐǇƐƚĞŵŝĐĂůůǇŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚ ? ?Turner Review, op cit 72 supra n8. 
50
 See SEC(2009) 576, Brussels, 30
th
 April 2009, Annex VI, 64 . 
51
 Joint Forum, Review of the Differentiated Nature and Scope of Financial Regulation - Key Issues and 
Recommendations, January 2010, 56. The Joint Forum consists of representatives of the Basel Committee, 
/K^KĂŶĚƚŚĞ /ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůƐƐŽĐŝĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ /ŶƐƵƌĂŶĐĞ^ƵƉĞƌǀŝƐŽƌƐ ? /ƚƐ ƚĂƐŬǁĂƐƚŽĂŶĂůǇƐĞ  ‘ƌĞŐƵůĂƚŽƌǇŐĂƉƐ ŝŶ
order to help to ensure that the scope and nature of ĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂůƌĞŐƵůĂƚŝŽŶĂƌĞĂƉƉƌŽƉƌŝĂƚĞ ? ?^ĞĞ' ? ? ?Progress 
Report on the Actions of the London and Washington G20 Summits, 5
th
 September 2009, para 58. 
52
 FSA, Assessing the possible sources of systemic risk, op cit supra n34. 
53
 SEC(2009) 576, op cit 64-68 supra n50. 
54
 See for example Reserve Bank of Australia, Hedge Funds, op cit 3 supra n26, arguing that hedge funds should 
ďĞ ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚ ƐǇƐƚĞŵŝĐĂůůǇ ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚ ďĞĐĂƵƐĞ  ‘ƚŚĞŝƌ ĂĐƚŝǀŝƚŝĞƐ ĐĂŶ ƌĞƐƵůƚ ŝŶ ĚĂŵĂŐŝŶŐ ĨŝƌĞ-sales of financial 
ĂƐƐĞƚƐ ? ?ĂŶĂŶĂůŽŐŽƵƐƉƌŽďlem to fire sales of bank loans which necessitate central bank lender of last resort 
operations. 
55
 FSB, Strengthening Oversight and Regulation of Shadow Banking, 18th November 2012, ii, 3 and 6. 
56
 At this point the market channel intersects with the credit channel  because forced sales also reduce the 
market value of the collateral against which highly leveraged, systemically important banks lend: see R. 
Bookstaber, A Demon of Our Own Design (Wiley, Hoboken, NJ 2007), 108. 
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among other things, includes providing finance to them.57 These banks ĂƌĞ  ‘ƚŽŽ-big-to-ĨĂŝů ? ?and so 
their liabilities are ultimately given an open-ended guarantee by states and taxpayers.  
This analysis clearly informed the AIFM Directive, which recognises that HFs might pose a threat to 
systemic stability. dŚĞŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ ?ƐĨŝƌƐƚƉƌŽƉŽƐĂůƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƐĞĚƚŚĂƚŚĞĚŐĞĨƵŶĚƐĂƌĞ ‘ǀƵůŶĞƌĂďůĞƚŽĂ
ǁŝĚĞƌĂŶŐĞŽĨƌŝƐŬƐ ?ǁŚŝĐŚ ‘ĂƌĞŽĨĚŝƌĞĐƚĐŽŶĐĞƌŶƚŽƚŚĞŝŶǀĞƐƚŽƌƐŝŶƚŚŽƐĞĨƵŶĚƐ ?ďƵƚĂůƐŽƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂ
threat to creditors, trading counterparties and to the stability and integrity of European financial 
markeƚƐ ? ?58 As regards the credit channel, the Impact Assessment, which accompanied the first 
proposal, rejected ƚŚĞ h< 'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ,& ŝŶĚƵƐƚƌǇ ?Ɛ ƉƌĞĨĞƌƌĞĚ ĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚ ƚŚĂƚ ,&Ɛ ĂƌĞ
already indirectly regulated by prudential regulation of the prime brokers who provide much of their 
leverage. It stated that  ‘ƌŝƐŬŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ ĨĂŝůƵƌĞƐĂƌĞƉŽƐƐŝďůĞ ?ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇ ŝĨĂ ĨƵŶĚďŽƌƌŽǁƐ ĨƌŽŵ
ŵƵůƚŝƉůĞ ƉƌŝŵĞ ďƌŽŬĞƌƐ ĂŶĚ ŚĞŶĐĞ ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ůĞŶĚĞƌƐ ŵĂǇ ŶŽƚ ŚĂǀĞ Ă ŐůŽďĂů ƉŝĐƚƵƌĞ ŽĨ Ă ĨƵŶĚ ?Ɛ
ůĞǀĞƌĂŐĞ ? ?59 ƐƌĞŐĂƌĚƐƚŚĞ ‘ŵĂƌŬĞƚĐŚĂŶŶĞů ? ?ƚŚĞ/ŵƉĂĐƚƐƐĞƐƐŵĞŶƚƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƐĞĚƚŚĂƚ ‘ŚĞĚŐĞĨƵŶĚƐ Q
have been an important contributor to asset prices dynamics in a number of financial (and possibly 
even non-ĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂů )ĂƐƐĞƚŵĂƌŬĞƚƐ ? ?60  
The enacted AIFM Directive clearly states that the use of leverage by HFs ŵĂǇ  ‘contribute to the 
build up of systemic risk or disorderly markets ? ?61 It also recognises that, when aggregated, even the 
activities of smaller HFs may give rise to systemic risks.62 Given the degree of integration of 
European capital markets but the concentration of AIFMs in the UK, this raised the question of 
whether HFs should be regulated at national or supranational level in order to ensure systemic 
stability.  
 
 
IV Who Should Regulate HFs: the Member States or the EU? 
A The Background of the AIFM Directive 
Within the EU, AIFMs are overwhelmingly concentrated in the UK.63 However, any systemic effects 
arising from their borrowing will be felt throughout the EU, setting up significant regulatory tension 
between the UK and the EU.  
Before the financial crisis, there was little regulation of hedge fund managers, and none which aimed 
to ensure that their activities (and specifically, their use of leverage) did not contribute to financial 
instability. Indeed, before the crisis, there was little direct macroprudential regulation of any kind 
because regulators were not required to, and did not, directly address the question of systemic 
stability.64 For example, the Basel Accords, which establish a microprudential regulatory schema for 
                                                          
57
 In the UK, in 2012, the FSA reported ƚŚĂƚ  ‘credit counterparty exposures of surveyed hedge funds remain 
fairly concentrated, with just five bĂŶŬƐ ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŝŶŐ ĨŽƌ ĂƉƉƌŽǆŝŵĂƚĞůǇ  ? ?A? ŽĨ ĂŐŐƌĞŐĂƚĞ ŚĞĚŐĞ ĨƵŶĚƐ ? ŶĞƚ
credit counterparty exposures ? ?^ĞĞ&^ ? Assessing the possible sources of systemic risk, op cit 18 supra n34.  
58
 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Alternative Investment Fund 
Managers and amending Directives 2004/39/EC and 2009/.../EC (COM(2009) 207 final, 30.4.2009), 2 
59
 Impact Assessment, Commission Staff Working Document Accompanying the Proposal for a Directive of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on Alternative Investment Fund Managers and Amending Directives 
2004/39/EC and 2009/.../EC (Brussels, 30.4.2009 SEC(2009) 576), Annex VI at 64. 
60
 Ibid at 68 
61
 AIFM Directive, op cit preamble, para 49 supra n1. 
62
 Ibid, preamble, para 14. 
63
 House of Commons Library, Reforming Financial Markets I: Hedge Funds, 21 January 2015 (SN/BT/5588) 
notes at 2.1 that  ‘since 80% of the industry affected is based in London, the proposals would affect the City 
ŵŽƌĞĞǆƚĞŶƐŝǀĞůǇƚŚĂŶƚŚĞƌĞƐƚŽĨƚŚĞh Q ? ? 
64
 See for example Regulation 1092/2010 op cit preamble, para 11, supra n10. 
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banks, assumed that if all banks are adequately regulated at the micro-level, this would ensure the 
stability of individual banks and the system as a whole.65 The financial crisis showed that this was a 
fallacy of composition because it failed to anticipate the ways in which banks might move liabilities 
off their balance sheets, as well as interdependencies between financial institutions.66  
AIFMs were left largely unregulated because of a belief in the UK and US, where most of them are 
located, that financial markets are self-correcting67; that the collective self-interest of the sector 
would result in the emergence of self-regulation68; and that their activities were regulated indirectly 
through the microprudential regulation of the prime broker banks which provide them with much of 
their leverage. These beliefs were driven by competitive pressures, ideology and the influence of 
industry groups.69 It is true that the UK required hedge fund managers to obtain authorisation under 
the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, but this was aimed primarily at ensuring that they had 
adequate internal controls, and they were not subject to any microprudential oversight. Similarly, in 
2003, some US-ďĂƐĞĚŚĞĚŐĞĨƵŶĚŵĂŶĂŐĞƌƐ ?ĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚƚŚĞƌĞĂƐ ‘ĂĚǀŝƐĞƌƐ ? )ǁĞƌĞĂůƌĞĂĚǇƌĞŐŝƐƚĞƌŝŶŐ
voluntarily with the SEC in order to meet investor preferences.70 In 2005, the SEC attempted to 
ƌĞƋƵŝƌĞ ƌĞŐŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ ďĂƐŝƐ ŽĨ  ‘ůŽŽŬŝŶŐ ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ? ŚĞĚŐĞ ĨƵŶĚƐ ƚŽ ƚŚĞŝƌ ŝŶǀĞƐƚŽƌƐ ? ďǇƉĂƐƐŝŶŐ Ă
legislative exemption and catching hedge fund advisers under the Advisers Act 1940, but this was 
ruled unlawful in 2006. In the event, the 2010 Dodd Frank Act deleted the exemption on which 
hedge fund managers relied, effectively requiring them all to register, and subjecting them to 
compliance and certain information disclosure obligations.71 In both the UK and the US, then, at 
least before 2010, registration was primarily aimed at protecting investors. 
The question of EU-level regulation of HFs first ĐĂŵĞŽŶƚŽƚŚĞŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ ?ƐĂŐĞŶĚĂwell before the 
crisis. A 2005 Green Paper proposed giving HFs and private equity (treated together as Alternative 
Investment Funds) a passport allowing them to offer their products throughout the EU.72 The private 
equity and hedge fund industries were unsurprisingly enthusiastic about this proposal.73 The 
decision to deal with HFs and private equity in a single instrument is sensible from an investor 
                                                          
65
 See for example Para 4 of Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, International Convergence of Capital 
Measurement and Capital Standards: A Revised Framework (Comprehensive Version), June 2006, which 
justifies microprudential regulation of banks in order ƚŽ ‘ĨƵƌƚŚĞƌƐƚƌĞŶŐƚŚĞŶƚŚĞƐŽƵŶĚŶĞƐƐĂŶĚƐƚĂďŝůŝƚǇŽĨƚŚĞ
ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůďĂŶŬŝŶŐƐǇƐƚĞŵ ?. 
66
 See International Monetary Fund, Macroprudential Policy: An Organizing Framework, March 2011, 9, noting 
the failure of traditional prudential policy because  ‘ĂĐƚŝŽŶƐ ƚŚĂƚ ĂƌĞ ĂƉƉƌŽƉƌŝĂƚĞ ĨŽƌ ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ĨŝƌŵƐ ŵĂǇ
collectively lead to, or exacerbate, system-ǁŝĚĞƉƌŽďůĞŵƐ ? ? 
67
  ?DƵŐŐĞ ?  ‘&ƌŽŵWƌĂŐŵĂƚŝƐŵƚŽŽŐŵĂƚŝƐŵ PƵƌŽƉĞĂŶhŶŝŽŶ'ǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ ?WŽůŝĐǇWĂƌĂdigms and Financial 
DĞůƚĚŽǁŶ ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ? ? ? )New Political Economy 185  
68
 This despite the fact that in the UK, less than 10% of hedge fund managers signed up to standards drafted by 
ƚŚĞ,ĞĚŐĞ&ƵŶĚtŽƌŬŝŶŐ'ƌŽƵƉ PƐĞĞ^ ?WĂŐůŝĂƌŝ ? ‘tŚŽ'ŽǀĞƌŶƐ&ŝŶĂŶĐĞ ?dŚĞ^Śifting Public-Private Debate in 
ƚŚĞZĞŐƵůĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĞƌŝǀĂƚŝǀĞƐ ?ZĂƚŝŶŐŐĞŶĐŝĞƐĂŶĚ,ĞĚŐĞ&ƵŶĚƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ? ? ? )European Law Journal 44 at 58. 
69
 ^ĞĞƌŝĐ,ĞůůĞŝŶĞƌĂŶĚ^ƚĞĨĂŶŽWĂŐůŝĂƌŝ ? ‘dŚĞŶĚŽĨ^ĞůĨ-Regulation? Hedge Funds and Derivatives in Global 
FinancŝĂů'ŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ ?ŝŶ,ĞůůĞŝŶĞƌ ?^WĂŐůŝĂƌŝĂŶĚ,ŝŵŵĞƌŵĂŶŶ ?ĞĚƐ )Global Finance in Crisis: The Politics of 
International Regulatory Change (Routledge, 2010) 
70
 See William H. Donaldson, Chairman, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Testimony Concerning 
Investor Protection Implications of Hedge Funds available online at: 
http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/041003tswhd.htm 
71
 ^ĞĞ t ?< ? ^ũŽƐƚƌŽŵ ?  ‘ ƌŝĞĨ ,ŝƐƚŽƌǇ ŽĨ ,ĞĚŐĞ &ƵŶĚ ĚǀŝƐĞƌ ZĞŐŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶ ĂŶĚ ŝƚƐ ŽŶƐĞƋƵĞŶĐĞƐ ĨŽƌ WƌŝǀĂƚĞ
Equity and Venture Capital AdǀŝƐĞƌƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ?Harvard Business Law Review Online 39. 
72
 Green Paper on the Enhancement of the EU Framework for Investment Funds (COM(2005) 0314 final, 
12.7.2005) 
73
 Buckley and Howarth note that the proposed Directive gave HFs the opportunity to market their products to 
 ‘ƚŚĞ  “ĐŽŶƐĞƌǀĂƚŝǀĞ ? ƉĞŶƐŝŽŶ ĨƵŶĚƐ ŝŶ DĞŵďĞƌ ^ƚĂƚĞƐ ƐƵĐŚĂƐ 'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ ĂŶĚ &ƌĂŶĐĞ ? P ƐĞĞJ. Buckley and D. 
Howarth, 'Internal Market: Gesture Politics? Explaining the EU's Response to the Financial Crisis' (2010) 48 
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protection perspective since they both offer alternative investments. However, from a regulatory 
perspective, it would have been preferable to deal with them separately since they give rise to very 
different concerns. dŚĞ ŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ ƚŚĞŶ ĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞĚ ĂŶ ĞǆƉĞƌƚ ŐƌŽƵƉ ?  ‘ǁŝƚŚ ŵĞŵďĞƌƐ ? ? ?
ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐŽĨĂůůŽƌƉĂƌƚŽĨ ƚŚĞh ŝŶǀĞƐƚŵĞŶƚ ĨƵŶĚ ŝŶĚƵƐƚƌǇ ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚǁĂƐŐŝǀĞŶ ƚŚĞ
goal of improvinŐ  ‘ƚŚĞĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶĐǇŽĨ ƚŚĞhŵĂƌŬĞƚ ĨŽƌ ŝŶǀĞƐƚŵĞŶƚ ĨƵŶĚƐ ?ǁŚŝůĞŵĂŝŶƚĂŝŶŝŶŐĂŚŝŐŚ
ůĞǀĞů ŽĨ ŝŶǀĞƐƚŽƌ ƉƌŽƚĞĐƚŝŽŶ ? ĂŶĚ ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌŝŶŐ  ‘ŝŵƉĂĐƚƐŽŶ ŽƚŚĞƌ ƐƚĂŬĞŚŽůĚĞƌƐ ? ?74 tŝƚŚ ŶŽ  ‘ŽƚŚĞƌ
ƐƚĂŬĞŚŽůĚĞƌƐ ?ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚ ?ƚŚĞĞǆƉĞƌƚŐƌŽƵƉƌĞƉŽƌƚƐĞŵƉŚĂƐŝƐĞĚƚŚĞƐŽĐŝĂůďĞŶĞĨŝƚƐŽĨƚŚĞƐĞĨƵŶĚƐ ?
ĂĐƚŝǀŝƚŝĞƐĂŶĚĚĞŵĂŶĚĞĚƚŚĞƌĞŵŽǀĂůŽĨ ‘ƵŶƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝǀĞ ?ŝŶĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚĂŶĚƵŶũƵƐƚŝĨŝĞĚůĞŐĂůŽƌƌĞŐƵůĂƚŽƌǇ
ŝŵƉĞĚŝŵĞŶƚƐ ? ƚŽ ŝŶǀĞƐƚŽƌƐ ĂĐĐĞƐƐŝŶŐ ƚŚĞŝƌ ƉƌŽĚƵĐƚƐ ? ďƵƚ ŽŵŝƚƚĞĚ ĂŶǇ ƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ƚŽ ƐƚĂŬĞŚŽůĚĞƌ
impacts. The hedge fund subgroup claimed that these funds posed no threat to financial stability 
because their main counterparty, the banks, are heavily regulated.75 It also emphasised that hedge 
ĨƵŶĚƐĂƌĞ  ‘ƚŚĞŵŽĚĞƌŶƉƌŽƉŽŶĞŶƚƐŽĨ ƚŚĞƐŚĂƌĞŚŽůĚĞƌ-ďĂƐĞĚŵŽĚĞůŽĨĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ ? ?ĂŶĚ
that other entities use leverage to fund their investments.76 It failed to discuss the risks associated 
with leverage at all.  
The output of this captured consultation process was counterbalanced by a highly critical report 
produced in March 2007 by the Party of European Socialists (PES).77 It set out the risks posed by HFs 
at length ĂŶĚĚŝƐŵŝƐƐĞĚĂƐĂ ‘ĨĂůůĂĐǇ ?ƚŚĞnotion of indirect regulation, and called for a far-reaching 
ĚŝƐĐůŽƐƵƌĞƌĞŐŝŵĞƚŽĞŶĂďůĞƌĞŐƵůĂƚŽƌƐďĞƚƚĞƌƚŽ ‘ĂƐƐĞƐƐƚŚĞĐŽŶƐĞƋƵĞŶĐĞƐƚŽƚŚĞĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂůŵĂƌŬĞƚ ?ŽĨ
HF transactions.78 The PES Report was followed by a resolution, passed by an overwhelming majority 
in the European Parliament, calling on the Commission to regulate hedge funds and private equity.79  
Whilst the Commission was considering how to move forward with the AIFM Directive, the financial 
crisis intervened, bringing the question of systemic stability to the top of the policy agenda. As part 
of its response to the crisis, the G20 decided to address regulation of HFs, effectively pre-empting 
the Commission. Fioretos notes that the UK government sought to use the G20 negotiations to 
preserve its indirect model of regulation, which targets prime brokers rather than HFs.80 In the 
event, the G20 agreed that HFs should be regulated in the interests of systemic stability,81 through a 
registration requirement for  ‘hedge funds or their managers ? ? ĐŽŵďŝŶĞĚ ǁŝƚŚ ĂŶ ŽďůŝŐĂƚŝŽŶ  ‘to 
disclose appropriate information on an ongoing basis to supervisors or regulators, including on their 
leverage, necessary for assessment of the systemic risks that they pose individually or collectively. ?82 
The G20 agreement accommodated both direct regulation (preferred by France and Germany) and 
                                                          
74
 Commission Decision of 5 December 2005 setting up a group of experts to report on ways to improve the 
efficiency of the EU investment fund market (C(2005) 4653, 5.12.2005); Expert Working Group on Investment 
Fund Market Efficiency: Terms of Reference, 31.1.2006, available online at  
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/investment/docs/other_docs/reports/efficiency-tor_en.pdf 
75
 See Managing, Servicing and Marketing Hedge Funds in Europe, Report of the Alternative Investment Expert 
Group, July 2006, European Commission Internal Market and Services DG, 12. 
76
 Ibid, 12 and 18. 
77
 PES, Hedge Funds and Private Equity: A Critical Analysis (April 2007) 
78
 Ibid, 163. 
79
 See Report with Recommendations to the Commission on Hedge Funds and Private Equity (2007/2238(INI), 
Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (A6-0338/2008, 11.9.2008) 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+REPORT+A6-2008-
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nd
 April 2009, para 15. 
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indirect regulation (preferred by the UK and the US).83 This allowed the UK to argue that  ‘ĂƐĞƉĂƌĂƚĞ
European rĞŐŝŵĞǁŽƵůĚďĞƌĞĚƵŶĚĂŶƚ ? ?84  
Nevertheless, the ŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ ?Ɛ ĨŝƌƐƚ ƉƌŽƉŽƐĂů ? ǁŚŝĐŚ ǁĂƐ ŝƐƐƵĞĚ ůĂƚĞƌ ƚŚĞƐĂŵĞ ŵŽŶƚŚ ?went 
considerably further than the G20 agreement. It embraced direct regulation of HFs, and that 
regulation consisted of clear rules in addition to discretionary regulation. Perhaps most notably, in 
ŽƌĚĞƌƚŽ  ‘ĞŶƐƵƌĞƚŚĞƐƚĂďŝůŝƚǇĂŶĚ ŝŶƚĞŐƌŝƚǇŽĨƚŚĞ ĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂůƐǇƐƚĞŵ ? ?the Commission gave itself the 
ƚĂƐŬŽĨ ‘ƐĞƚƚŝŶŐůŝŵŝƚƐƚŽƚŚĞůĞǀĞůŽĨůĞǀĞƌĂŐĞ ?ŚĞĚŐĞĨƵŶĚŵĂŶĂŐĞƌƐ ?ĐĂŶĞŵƉůŽǇ ?.85 It also proposed 
ƐƚƌŝĐƚƌƵůĞƐƌĞůĂƚŝŶŐƚŽƚŚĞĚŝƐĐůŽƐƵƌĞŽĨůĞǀĞƌĂŐĞ ?ƌĞƋƵŝƌŝŶŐ,&ƐƚŚĂƚĞŵƉůŽǇ ‘ŚŝŐŚůĞǀĞůƐŽĨůĞǀĞƌĂŐĞ
ŽŶ Ă ƐǇƐƚĞŵĂƚŝĐ ďĂƐŝƐ ? ? ĚĞĨŝŶĞĚ ĂƐ ůĞǀĞƌĂŐĞ ĞǆĐĞĞĚŝŶŐ ĞƋƵŝƚǇ ĐĂƉŝƚĂů ŝŶ ƚǁŽ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƉƌĞǀŝŽƵƐ ĨŽƵƌ
quarters, to make disclosure to investors and competent authorities.86 It then allowed national 
ĐŽŵƉĞƚĞŶƚ ĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚŝĞƐ ?  ‘ŝŶ ĞǆĐĞƉƚŝŽŶĂů ĐŝƌĐƵŵƐƚĂŶĐĞƐ ? ĂŶĚ  ‘in order to ensure the stability and 
ŝŶƚĞŐƌŝƚǇŽĨƚŚĞĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂůƐǇƐƚĞŵ ?ƚŽ ‘impose additional limits to the level of leverage that AIFM can 
ĞŵƉůŽǇ ? ?87  
 
Following publication of this proposal, the UK Government joined with HF industry lobby groups to 
launch an intensive  W and successful  W lobbying campaign.88 The proposed cap on leverage was 
particularly unacceptable to them.89 In June 2009, the International Organization of Securities 
Commissions (IOSCO) ƉƵďůŝƐŚĞĚ  ‘Ă ƐĞƚŽĨ ŚŝŐŚ-level principles for hedge fund regulation, including 
mandatory registration, regulation and provision of information for systemic risk assessment 
ƉƵƌƉŽƐĞƐ ? ?90 dŚĞ Ăŝŵ ŽĨ ŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů ƌĞŐƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ǁĂƐ ƚŽ  ‘allow the regulator at the level of the funds 
themselves to get an overall picture of the ƌŝƐŬƐ ƉŽƐĞĚ ďǇ ƚŚĞ ŚĞĚŐĞ ĨƵŶĚƐ ? ?91 with disclosure 
ŝŶƚĞŶĚĞĚƚŽ ‘help regulators to identify current or potential sources of systemic risk that hedge funds 
may pose, either individually or collectively ? ?92 Unlike the ŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ ?Ɛproposal, the IOSCO 
principles noted, and accommodated, the divergent national regulatory approaches.93  
 
B The AIFM ŝƌĞĐƚŝǀĞ ?ƐŝǀŝƐŝŽŶŽĨZĞŐƵůĂƚŽƌǇƵƚhority over Leverage  
                                                          
83
 G20, Enhancing Sound Regulation and Strengthening Transparency, Final Report, March 25, 2009 notes that 
 ‘After identifying financial institutions, markets or instruments presenting risks that regulators wish to address, 
this could then be achieved over time as appropriate, whether by direct or indirect regulation, depending on 
ƚŚĞ ŶĂƚƵƌĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƌŝƐŬ ĂŶĚ ?Žƌ ƚŚĞ ŝŶƚĞŶƐŝƚǇ ŽĨ ŽǀĞƌƐŝŐŚƚ ƚŚĂƚ ŝƐ ĚĞƐŝƌĞĚ ? ?For discussion of this in terms of 
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whilst ƉƌŽǀŝĚŝŶŐĨŽƌŐƌĞĂƚĞƌŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůĐŽŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƐĞĞ&ŝŽƌĞƚŽƐ ? ‘ĂƉŝƚĂůŝƐƚŝǀĞƌƐŝƚǇ ?ŽƉĐŝƚ ? ? ?-8 supra n6.  
84
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 Commission Proposal, op cit Art 25(3) supra n58. 
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 Ibid, Arts 22-24. 
87
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 House of Commons Library, Reforming Financial Markets I: Hedge Funds, 21 January 2015 (SN/BT/5588) 
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The tension between the EU and the UK is nowhere clearer than in the controversy over how 
leverage should be regulated. &ŽůůŽǁŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ h< ?Ɛsuccessful lobbying campaign,94 the enacted 
Directive abandoned the notion of EU-wide limits on leverage in favour of a more complex scheme. 
 
First, in order to obtain authorisation, AIFMs are obliged to set a maximum level of leverage that the 
hedge funds they manage will employ,95 and to demonstrate to the national competent authority 
that those limits are reasonable and that they comply with them at all times.96 They are also 
required to set limits to rehypothecation of collateral, for each fund they manage,97 and to make 
regular reports to the national competent authority, covering the assets in which the funds they 
manage have invested, risk profiles and risk management, liquidity arrangements and so on.98  
Second, AIFMs which employ leverage, whether financial or synthetic,  ‘ŽŶ Ă ƐƵďƐƚĂŶƚŝĂů ďĂƐŝƐ ? ĂƌĞ
required to make a number of disclosures about their leverage to national competent authorities.99 
In place of the clear definition in the first draft, the Commission was given the task of adopting 
ĚĞůĞŐĂƚĞĚ ĂĐƚƐ ĚĞĨŝŶŝŶŐ  ‘ƐƵďƐƚĂŶƚŝĂů ?. When it made this definition, the Commission rejected the 
European SĞĐƵƌŝƚŝĞƐ ĂŶĚ DĂƌŬĞƚƐ ƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇ ?Ɛ  ?^D )astonishing market liberalist advice that this 
key definition should be left to AIFMs themselves.100 Ultimately, use of leverage will be considered 
 ‘ƐƵďƐƚĂŶƚŝĂů ? ǁŚĞƌĞ  ‘ƚŚĞ ĞǆƉŽƐƵƌĞ ŽĨ  ?Ă ŚĞĚŐĞ ĨƵŶĚ ? ĂƐ ĐĂůĐƵůĂƚĞĚ ĂĐĐording to the commitment 
ŵĞƚŚŽĚ QĞǆĐĞĞĚƐ ƚŚƌĞĞ ƚŝŵĞƐ ŝƚƐŶĞƚĂƐƐĞƚǀĂůƵĞ ? ?101  The commitment method examines the net 
exposure of the HF, so it includes repo exposure, 102 but it also takes account of the hedging and 
netting techniques used by the manager, which is particularly relevant to assessing synthetic 
leverage.103 AIFMs which fall into this category are required to make certain disclosures, including 
 ‘ƚŚĞŝĚĞŶƚŝƚǇŽĨƚŚĞĨŝǀĞůĂƌŐĞƐƚƐŽƵƌĐĞƐŽĨďŽƌƌŽǁĞĚĐĂƐŚŽƌƐĞĐƵƌŝƚŝĞƐĨŽƌĞĂĐŚŽĨƚŚĞ ?HFs]... and the 
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amounts of leverage received from each of those sources for each of those [HFs ? ? ?104 Since the 
number of prime brokers is limited, the clear assumption is that disclosure of the five most 
important sources of leverage will give national regulators a fairly clear picture of the extent of 
leverage of hedge funds.105  
 
National competent authorities are then to use this ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶƚŽŝĚĞŶƚŝĨǇ ‘ƚŚĞĞǆƚĞŶƚƚŽǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞ
use of leverage contributes to the build-up of systemic risk in the financial system, risks of disorderly 
markets or risks to the long-ƚĞƌŵŐƌŽǁƚŚŽĨƚŚĞĞĐŽŶŽŵǇ ? ?106 tŚĞƌĞƚŚĞǇĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌ ŝƚ  ‘necessary to 
ĞŶƐƵƌĞƚŚĞƐƚĂďŝůŝƚǇĂŶĚŝŶƚĞŐƌŝƚǇŽĨƚŚĞĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂůƐǇƐƚĞŵ ? ?ƚŚĞǇƐŚŽƵůĚ ‘ŝŵƉŽƐĞůŝŵŝƚƐƚŽƚŚĞůĞǀĞůŽĨ
leverage that [a hedge fund manager is] entitled to employ or other restrictions on the management 
ŽĨƚŚĞ ?ŚĞĚŐĞĨƵŶĚ ? ? ?107 This provision was preserved from the first draft directive; however, in the 
absence of absolute limits set at EU level on the amount of leverage HFs are entitled to deploy, this 
provision becomes central to preventing HFs contributing to systemic instability. The next section 
argues that this provision of the Directive gives regulators an impossible task. This section confines 
its analysis to the decision to confer responsibility on national regulators for assessing the risks 
arising from observed patterns of leverage.  
 
Romano claims that the absence of regulatory diversity was a key cause of the financial crisis, and 
ĂƌŐƵĞƐ ƚŚĂƚ  ‘ZĞŐƵůĂƚŽƌǇŚĂƌŵŽŶŝǌĂƚŝŽŶĐĂŶ ŝƚƐĞůĨŐĞŶĞƌĂƚĞƐǇƐƚĞŵŝĐƌŝƐŬ ƚŽƚŚĞĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂůƐǇƐƚĞŵ ? ? /Ŷ
support of this claim, she refers to the Basel Accords, which encouraged most banks to adopt similar 
strategies and risk models.108 Accordingly, she calls for regulatory schemes which rely on a 
multiplicity of regulators, because this will allow for regulatory arbitrage as AIFMs move to the 
jurisdiction whose regulation best suits their needs. 
 
There are two main objections to adopting this approach in the EU context. First, the concentration 
of AIFMs in the UK means that tŚĞ h< ĂůƌĞĂĚǇ ŚĂƐ Ă ĚŽŵŝŶĂŶƚ ƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ  ‘ŵĂƌŬĞƚ ĨŽƌAIFM 
ƌĞŐƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?dŚĞh<has a very explicit focus on the competitiveness of its regulatory environment,109 
making it unlikely that the FCA will adopt a strict line on the reasonableness of hedge fund 
leverage.110 If other Member States want to attract AIFMs and take regulatory market share from 
the UK, they can only do so ďǇŽĨĨĞƌŝŶŐĞǀĞŶŵŽƌĞ ‘ĐŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝǀĞ ?ƌĞŐƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ?This creates a likelihood 
of ĐŽŶǀĞƌŐĞŶĐĞ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ h< ?Ɛ ŵŽĚĞů ? ĂŶĚ ƉĞƌŚĂƉƐa race to the bottom, rather than diversity of 
regulation. Second, and more importantly, if a permissive regime allows an AIFM to take on 
excessive leverage, and that fund subsequently becomes insolvent, the losses will spread around 
financial institutions in various Member States. Rather than being concentrated in the Member State 
charged with regulating the AIFM in question, this potentially impacts on taxpayers in other Member 
States if they are required to bail out a systemically important financial institution in their 
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jurisdiction. Similarly, disruptions through the market channel will occur in the Member State where 
the manager determined the fund should make leveraged investments, and not necessarily in the 
Member State where the manager is based. Unlike the United States, where, in any competition to 
attract AIFMs, the states would be competing to attract AIFMs against the backdrop of an implicit 
federal guarantee of the banking system, the EU Member States each offer an implicit guarantee of 
their national banking systems. As such, there is a real danger that an EU-wide  ‘ŵĂƌŬĞƚ ĨŽƌ /&D
ƌĞŐƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ?ǁŝůůcreate significant externalities, with lax national regulation benefitting the regulating 
Member State in terms of attracting AIFMs, but imposing costs on other Member States.  
 
Accordingly, regulatory authority over AIFMs cannot be left in the hands of the Member States 
alone, and the AIFM Directive embeds national regulators in a supranational governance process. In 
addition to  ‘Ă ĨĂĐŝůŝƚĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚĐŽŽƌĚŝŶĂƚŝŽŶƌŽůĞ ? in relation to leverage limits,111 ESMA is given the 
power to ask national authorities to intervene in relation to specific AIFMs. ESMA can, on the basis 
ŽĨƚŚĞŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶĚŝƐĐůŽƐĞĚƚŽŝƚďǇŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚŝĞƐĂŶĚŽĨƚŚĞĂĚǀŝĐĞŽĨƚŚĞ^Z ? ‘ĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĞ
that the leverage employed by an AIFM, or by a group of AIFMs, poses a substantial risk to the 
ƐƚĂďŝůŝƚǇ ĂŶĚ ŝŶƚĞŐƌŝƚǇ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂů ƐǇƐƚĞŵ ? ? tŚĞƌĞ D^ ƌĞĂĐŚĞƐ ƚŚŝƐ ĐŽŶĐůƵƐŝŽŶ ? ŝƚ ĐĂŶ ŝƐƐƵĞ
advice to competent authorities specifying the remedial measures to be taken, including imposing 
leverage limits on specific hedge fund managers.112 This power has its origins in a European 
Parliament report on the first draft, but was weakened in the final directive.113 National authorities 
ĂƌĞŶŽƚďŽƵŶĚďǇ^D ?ƐĂĚǀŝĐe, but must give reasons for non-compliance. ESMA can then publish 
details of this non-ĐŽŵƉůŝĂŶĐĞ ĂŶĚ ŵĂǇ ĂůƐŽ ƉƵďůŝƐŚ ƚŚĞ ƌĞĂƐŽŶƐ ŐŝǀĞŶ ? dŚŝƐ  ‘ŶĂŵĞ ĂŶĚ ƐŚĂŵĞ ?
ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ ŵĂǇ ĐƌĞĂƚĞ ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ƉƌĞƐƐƵƌĞ ĨŽƌ ŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů ƌĞŐƵůĂƚŽƌƐ ƚŽ ĐŽŵƉůǇ ǁŝƚŚ ^D ?Ɛ ĂĚǀŝĐĞ ? ĂŶĚ
therefore result in a degree of coordination of national policies on leverage limits. It also potentially 
creates scope for a process of dialogue and learning between national regulators and ESMA where 
they take divergent approaches. However, with the vast majority of AIFMs based in the UK, it 
remains to be seen whether ESMA adopts an interventionist approach. ^D ?Ɛ ƌĞĐŽŵŵĞŶĚĂƚŝŽŶ, 
discussed above,114 ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ ŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ ůĞĂǀĞ /&DƐ ƚŽ ĚĞĨŝŶĞ ǁŚĞƚŚĞƌ ƚŚĞǇ ĚĞƉůŽǇ  ‘ƐƵďƐƚĂŶƚŝĂů ?
leverage, suggests that ESMA operates within a market liberalist paradigm and that interventions 
will be rare. 
These provisions of the AIFM Directive illustrate the tension between the competing interests in 
national and supranational regulation of HFs. The Directive attempts to resolve this tension by 
correcting for the flawed incentives for national regulators, whilst still leaving the UK scope to 
ŵĂŝŶƚĂŝŶ ŝƚƐ  ‘ĐŽŵƉĂƌĂƚŝǀĞ ĂĚǀĂŶƚĂŐĞ ? ŝŶ ĂƚƚƌĂĐƚŝŶŐ /&DƐ ? ,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ? ŝŶ ŝƚƐ ĐŽŵƉůĞǆŝƚǇ ?it contrasts 
sharply with the absolute cap on leverage contained in the original proposal. The success of the 
Directive will therefore hinge on national and supranational regulators identifying situations in which 
leverage poses a threat to systemic stability. The next section will argue that this is an impossible 
task for regulators. 
 
 
V How Should Hedge Funds Be Regulated? 
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A Leverage 
We saw above that the first draft AIFM Directive included a controversial proposal for a cap on HF 
leverage, but that it was sidelined as a result of intensive lobbying by the UK government and HFs. 
This occurred against the backdrop of an emerging international consensus among regulators that a 
combination of information disclosure and discretionary regulation will suffice to prevent HF 
leverage contributing to systemic instability. The De Larosiere Report115 ĐĂůůĞĚ ĨŽƌ  ‘appropriate 
regulation ?ŽĨ ‘all firms or entities conducting financial activities which may have a systemic impact ? ?
This would entail  ‘ŐƌĞĂƚĞƌƚƌĂŶƐƉĂƌĞŶĐǇ ? ?ďŽƚŚƚŽĂƐƐŝƐƚƚŚĞďĂŶŬƐǁŚŝĐŚůĞŶĚƚŽƚŚĞŵ ?ĂŶĚďĞĐĂƵƐĞ 
 ‘ƐƵƉĞƌǀŝƐŽƌƐŶĞĞĚƚŽŬŶŽǁǁŚŝĐŚŚĞĚŐĞĨƵŶĚƐĂƌĞŽĨƐǇƐƚĞŵŝĐŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶĐĞ ? ?ŵŽŶƚŚůĂƚĞƌ ?ƚŚĞ&^ ?Ɛ
Turner Review recommended that macroƉƌƵĚĞŶƚŝĂů ƌĞŐƵůĂƚŽƌƐ  ‘gather much more extensive 
information on hedge fund activities ? ? ĂŶĚ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞǇ ďĞ ŐŝǀĞŶ  ‘the power to apply appropriate 
prudential regulation (e.g. capital and ůŝƋƵŝĚŝƚǇƌƵůĞƐ )ƚŽŚĞĚŐĞĨƵŶĚƐ Qif at any time they judge that 
the activities have become bank-ůŝŬĞ ŝŶ ŶĂƚƵƌĞ Žƌ ƐǇƐƚĞŵŝĐ ŝŶ ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶĐĞ ? ?116 These 
recommendations were echoed by IOSCO117 and the FSB.118 The AIFM Directive adopted in June 
2011 reflects this consensus among regulators. Far from representing a paradigm shift, the Directive 
extends certain aspects of the pre-crisis approach to banking supervision to HFs, with the 
macroprudential gloss that regulators should also consider systemic stability in deciding whether to 
intervene.  
dŚĞ:ŽŝŶƚ&ŽƌƵŵ ?ƐƌĞƉŽƌƚ articulated a thorough case against the imposition of a leverage cap on all 
HFs,119 which merits more detailed consideration. It noted ƚŚĂƚ ‘Supervisors do not constrain the use 
of leverage by funds ? ?120 but emphasised that  ‘ƐĞƚƚŝŶŐůĞǀĞƌĂŐĞĐĂƉƐĐŽƵůĚďĞĞǆƚƌĞŵĞůǇĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚĂŶĚ
ĐŽŵƉůĞǆ ? ?121 It also doubted the wisdom of a single cap,  ‘ŐŝǀĞŶƚŚĞĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĞƐĂŶĚĂĐƚŝǀŝƚŝĞƐ
of hedge funds and because the true extent of leverage cannot be easily figured out without 
ĂŶĂůǇƐŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ĞŵďĞĚĚĞĚ ůĞǀĞƌĂŐĞ ŝŶ ĞĂĐŚ ƵŶĚĞƌůǇŝŶŐ ŝŶǀĞƐƚŵĞŶƚ ? ?In response to this, it is worth 
pointing out that a cap would only affect those HFs which use the highest levels of leverage; the 
& ?ƐĂŶŶƵĂů,ĞĚŐĞ&ƵŶĚ^ƵƌǀĞǇƐŚĂǀĞ ƌĞƉĞĂƚĞĚůǇindicated that most of the financial leverage is 
concentrated in a handful of HFs. The Joint Forum then raised the important point that  ‘ƐĞƚƚŝŶŐĂŶ
ĂƌďŝƚƌĂƌǇĐĂƉĐŽƵůĚĐĂƵƐĞŵĂƌŬĞƚĚŝƐƚŽƌƚŝŽŶ ?. It might, for example, cause HFs which run up against 
the cap to take on additional leverage in its synthetic, embedded  W and harder to detect  W form, and 
so actually result in a more unstable financial system. However, under the enacted Directive, the 
difficulties associated with setting a leverage cap do not disappear entirely; as we saw above, it is 
simply delegated to national regulators on a conditional basis under a complex supranational 
scheme. Rather than abandon the cap and rely on prudential supervisoƌƐƚŽ ‘cap leverage for a fund 
ŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĞĚĂƐƉŽƐŝŶŐƐǇƐƚĞŵŝĐƌŝƐŬ ?, it would be more prudent for a cap to be imposed and then be 
supplemented with a discretionary regulatory regime. The first draft directive did this by allowing 
national supervisors to impose restrictions on leverage additional to the cap where they considered 
individual HFs to pose a threat to systemic stability. That scheme would have ruled out the most 
extreme uses of leverage, guarding against the worst instances of regulatory failure, but then 
allowed regulators to impose further restrictions in the interests of systemic stability.  
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In relying so heavily on information disclosure, the Directive reduces the threat posed by HFs to 
systemic stability to one of information asymmetry  W if the regulators knew what risks and what 
positions HFs were taking, then they would be able to intervene where necessary to ensure the 
stability of the financial system. This approach has now been extended to the broader question of 
how the shadow banking system should be regulated,122 as can be seen from ƚŚĞ ŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ ?Ɛ
proposal for an SFT Regulation.123 The ^&d ZĞŐƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ?Ɛorigins can be traced to FSB Reports of 
2011124 and 2013,125  which ĂĚǀŽĐĂƚĞĚ ĐŽůůĞĐƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ĚĂƚĂ ĂďŽƵƚ  ‘repo exposures amongst large 
international financial institutions ?because ƚŚŝƐŚĂƐ  ‘ƚŚĞƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂů ƚŽƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƵƐĞĨƵů ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶƚŽ
ĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚŝĞƐ ƚŽ ŚĞůƉ ƚŽ ĚĞƚĞĐƚ ĂŶĚ ŵŽŶŝƚŽƌ ƌŝƐŬƐ ĂƐ ƚŚĞǇ ƵŶĨŽůĚ ? ?126 The Commission ?Ɛ  ? ? ? ? 
Communication on Shadow Banking127 emphasised the need for Member States to identify and 
monitor the risks arising from the repo market. In January 2014, the Commission proposed the SFT 
Regulation to address the &^ ?Ɛtransparency recommendations and as a means of imposing limited 
regulation on rehypothecation.128 The SFT Regulation requires financial institutions, including HFs129  
to disclose their involvement in SFTs to a registered trade repository or to ESMA,130 which should 
then be aggregated and published, as well as passed on to the European Banking Authority.131 If 
adopted, the SFT Regulation will supplement the information provided to regulators under the AIFM 
Directive with the detailed information about the size and concentration of the repo market that 
they currently lack. On the basis of this more detailed information, it is open to them to decide to 
exercise their powers, discussed above, to impose limitations on the use of leverage by particular 
HFs because of concerns about systemic stability.  
 
Both the AIFM Directive and the proposed SFT Regulation share an assumption that, given enough 
information, regulators will be able to determine when leverage poses a threat to the stability of the 
financial system. Regulators must identify when the use and distribution of leverage in the financial 
system is such that its unwinding will either threaten the solvency of a systemically important bank, 
or will destabilise financial markets. Hence, the success of these instruments in preventing systemic 
instability will depend on the willingness of national regulators to intervene. Even leaving aside the 
 ‘ƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐŽĨďŽŽŵƐ ?, which make it difficult for regulators to exercise their powers in a pre-emptive 
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manner,132 the inherent uncertainty of financial markets arguably makes it impossible for regulators 
to know when a single HF has borrowed so much, or the securities financing market has expanded so 
far, that a reversal of the leveraging process will result in financial instability. These complex and 
unpredictable dynamics are the territory explored in the work of Hyman Minsky, which highlights 
the impossibility of the task confronting regulators.  
 
DŝŶƐŬǇ ?Ɛ ƐƚĂƌƚŝŶŐ ƉŽŝŶƚ ŝƐ ƚŚĂƚ ƵŶĐĞƌƚĂŝŶƚǇ ŝƐ Ă  ‘ĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĂŶƚ ŽĨ ƐǇƐƚĞŵďĞŚĂǀŝŽƌ ? ?133 In modern 
capitalist economies (as opposed to the neoclassical theoretical economy), financial actors always 
use external funds (that is, leverage) to finance positions in assets, and this  ‘ƉĂƌƚŝƚŝŽŶƐ ĂŶĚ
ĚŝƐƚƌŝďƵƚĞƐƵŶĐĞƌƚĂŝŶƚǇ ? ?This is uncertainty in the radical, Knightian sense that no probabilities can 
be assigned to alternative possibilities.134 /ŶDŝŶƐŬǇ ?ƐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐh, uncertainty characterises financial 
ŝŶǀĞƐƚŵĞŶƚďĞĐĂƵƐĞĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂůĂĐƚŽƌƐ ‘ĂƌĞŶŽƚŽŶůǇƵŶƐƵƌĞĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞǀĂůŝĚŝƚǇŽĨƚŚĞŵŽĚĞůƚŚĂƚŐƵŝĚĞƐ
ƚŚĞŝƌ ĂĐƚŝŽŶƐ ? ƚŚĞǇ ŝŵƉƵƚĞ ƐƵĐŚ ƵŶĐĞƌƚĂŝŶƚǇ ƚŽ ƚŚĞŽƚŚĞƌ ĂĐƚŽƌƐ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ĞĐŽŶŽŵǇ ? ?135 This pervasive 
uncertainty means that markets are characterised by mood swings. DŝŶƐŬǇĂƌŐƵĞĚƚŚĂƚ ‘ĞƵƉŚŽƌŝĂŝƐ
Ă ŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇ ƉƌĞůƵĚĞ ƚŽ Ă ĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂů ĐƌŝƐŝƐ ĂŶĚ Q ŝƐ ĂůŵŽƐƚ ĂŶ ŝŶĞǀŝƚĂďůĞ ƌĞƐƵůƚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƐƵĐĐĞƐƐĨƵů
ĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶŝŶŐ ŽĨ ĂŶ ĞŶƚĞƌƉƌŝƐĞ ĞĐŽŶŽŵǇ ? ?136 As euphoria takes hold, and a boom gets underway, 
financial actors begin to factor continued expansion and rises in asset prices into their expectations 
with increasing confidence. As optimism grows and uncertainty apparently decreases, asset prices 
rise further, which in turn allows more collateralised borrowing to occur.137 Hence the boom sows 
the seeds of future financial instability as financial institutions agree to finance positions in assets 
that they would not have considered unacceptable before the boom. Positions which would 
previously have been considered as speculative or Ponzi finance come to be viewed by lenders as 
acceptably safe hedge financing.138 As demand for credit rises, the interest rates demanded by banks 
and money market funds will eventually rise, and once this occurs, the rate of increase in asset 
prices will slow and then go into reverse, making the future look uncertain once again. The problem 
which is most relevant to the discussion here is that positions in assets which were financed during 
 ‘ƚŚĞďƵƌƐƚŽĨĞƵƉŚŽƌŝĂ ? no longer look viable, and financial actors do not know whether ƚŚĞƐĞ ‘now 
less-ĚĞƐŝƌĂďůĞ ĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂů ƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƐ ǁŝůů ďĞ ƵŶǁŽƵŶĚ ǁŝƚŚŽƵƚ ŐĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŶŐ ĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂů ƐŚŽĐŬƐ ? ?139 The 
ĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨDŝŶƐŬǇ ?ƐƚŚĞŽƌǇƚŽƚŚĞĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶĂďŽǀĞŽĨƚŚĞƌŝƐŬƐƚŽƐǇƐƚĞŵŝĐƐƚĂďŝůŝƚǇŝƐĂďƐŽlutely 
clear. Once leveraged financial actors seek to unwind the positions they took during the period of 
optimism, this compounds the price falls, triggering further sales, and, depending on the scale of the 
unwinding, potentially resulting in systemic instability through both the credit and the market 
channels.  
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Taking DŝŶƐŬǇ ?Ɛ ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ƚŽuncertainty seriously implies that regulators are unable to identify 
when the leverage that has built up within the financial system has funded a set of positions in 
assets which pose a threat to the stability of the financial system. What looked like a safe system of 
financing under one set of assumptions about the future is suddenly revealed to be extremely risky 
as soon as those assumptions change. Central bankers recognise this uncertainty, regularly stating 
that they are not able to identify asset price bubbles in advance, and that they cannot reliably 
intervene on the basis that asset prices have departed from fair value.140 Instead, they focus on 
dealing with the aftermath of the asset price collapse. Central banks were able to stave off a deep 
depression following the financial crisis by providing enormous quantities of liquidity to the financial 
sector, reducing short-term interest rates to near (and in some cases, below) zero, and driving down 
long-term interest rates through extraordinary monetary policies, such as quantitative easing. This is 
ƚŚĞĐĞŶƚƌĂůďĂŶŬƵƐŝŶŐŝƚƐ ‘ƵůƚŝŵĂƚĞǁĞĂƉŽŶĨŽƌǀĂůŝĚĂƚŝŶŐĂĚĞďƚƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞ ? ?141 making positions taken 
out during the boom appear viable, and so protecting the solvency of systemically important 
financial institutions. However, use of this  ‘ultimate weapon ? is not costless. It creates moral hazard, 
reassuring financial actors that they will be saved, and by reducing the cost of finance and even 
normalising zero interest rates, it sows the seeds of the next boom and subsequent bust in asset 
prices, as can be seen in market reactions to any threat to end the current monetary 
accommodation. 
The AIFM Directive and the SFT Regulation are arguably incapable of preventing HFs contributing to 
financial instability because they rely on regulators being able to identify in advance when the use of 
ůĞǀĞƌĂŐĞƉŽƐĞƐĂƚŚƌĞĂƚƚŽƚŚĞƐǇƐƚĞŵ ?DŝŶƐŬǇ ?ƐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƌĞ ŝƐŶŽďĂƐŝƐŽŶǁŚich 
they can possibly do this, because leverage and asset prices drive each other reflexively, upwards 
and downwards. A quantitative risk analysis cannot be used to regulate a financial system 
characterised by Knightian uncertainty. Yet without such an analysis, regulators have no objective 
basis on which to justify a discretionary decision to intervene.  
The implosion of the Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) hedge fund in 1998, which gave rise to 
a systemic event and required an enormous bailout by a consortium of private financial 
institutions,142 demonstrates the impossibility of making ex ante assessments of the risks posed by 
HF leverage. >dD ‘ƌĞƉŽƌƚĞĚůǇŚĂĚŽǀĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? ?ƚƌĂĚĞƐŽŶŝƚƐďŽŽŬƐ ? ?143 including extremely complex 
positions in derivatives. It funded its positions in assets through repo transactions on government 
bonds with seventy five different counterparties.144 When LTCM hit financial difficulties, its extensive 
use of repos forced it into repeated rounds of asset liquidation.145 Its  ‘ĞǆĐĞƉƚŝŽŶĂů ?use of leverage 
was made possible because its lenders, which included systemically important banks, suffered from 
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 ‘ƌŝƐŬ ŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ ? ĨĂŝůƵƌĞƐ ?146 Its founders, who had an extraordinary depth of experience and 
expertise,147 ĂŶĚŚĂĚĨƵůůĂĐĐĞƐƐƚŽƚŚĞĨƵŶĚ ?ƐďĂůĂnce sheet, failed to identify the risks confronting 
the fund in advance. It seems implausible to argue that a regulator, even one in full possession of 
>dD ?ƐďĂůĂŶĐĞƐŚĞĞƚ ?ǁŽƵůĚŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶĂďůĞƚŽƉƌĞĚŝĐƚƚŚŝƐƐǇƐƚĞŵŝĐĞǀĞŶƚ ? 
 
As required by the AIFM Directive,148 the Commission has now produced a delegated regulation 
setting out principles that specify when Member States should impose limits on leverage.149 That 
regulation requires national regulators to take account of various considerations, including whether 
 ‘ĞǆƉŽƐƵƌĞƐ Q ĐŽƵůĚ ĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞ ĂŶ ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚ ƐŽƵƌĐĞ ŽĨ ŵĂƌŬĞƚ ? ůŝƋƵŝĚŝƚǇ Žƌ ĐŽƵŶƚĞƌƉĂƌƚǇ ƌŝƐŬ ƚŽ Ă
ĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂůŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶ ? ?ĂŶĚǁŚĞƚŚĞƌƚŚĞƵƐĞŽĨůĞǀĞƌĂŐĞ ‘ĐŽƵůĚĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚĞƚŽĂĚŽǁŶǁĂƌĚƐƉŝƌĂůŝŶƚŚĞ
prices of financial instruments or other assets in a manner that threatens the viability of such 
ĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂů ŝŶƐƚƌƵŵĞŶƚƐ Žƌ ŽƚŚĞƌ ĂƐƐĞƚƐ ?.150 These principles do not provide useful guidance to 
regulators as to when to intervene; they simply restate the problem. DŝŶƐŬǇ ?ƐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƐŚŽǁƐƚŚĂƚ
leverage always potentially creates systemic risks through the credit and market channels, but that 
there is no clear advance indicator of when this has actually occurred. Regulators face the same 
uncertainty as financial actors when trying to gauge the future evolution of the financial system. Yet 
regulators operating under this scheme are supposed to base decisions to intervene on a 
quantitative analysis of risk. For example, in its regulatory handbook, tŚĞh< ?ƐFCA, which authorises 
UK-based AIFMs and receives disclosures from AIFMs about the maximum levels of leverage their 
funds employ,151 simply ƌĞĨĞƌƐ/&DƐƚŽƚŚĞƌĞůĞǀĂŶƚƐĞĐƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ ?ƐĚĞůĞŐĂƚĞĚĂĐƚ ?152 
However, its website states that the FCA assesses risk by calculating the impact of the problem if it 
occurs but discounting that impact by the probability, and then deciding whether to allocate 
resources to it.153 In other words, tŚĞ & ?Ɛ ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚproceeds on the basis ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ  ‘ĐŽƐƚƐ ? ŽĨ
excessive lending, in terms of their implications for systemic stability, can be calculated by reference 
to the probability of a systemic event occurring. dŚŝƐŝƐƚŚĞĂŶƚŝƚŚĞƐŝƐŽĨDŝŶƐŬǇ ?ƐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ? 
This analysis suggests that the regulatory scheme gives regulators an impossible task because they 
have no meaningful guide to when intervention is required. Any probability used by the regulator 
will be based on past performance of the financial system, and therefore is almost certain to be 
wrong. For this reason, DŝŶƐŬǇ ?ƐƉƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞǁĂƐĨŽƌďƌŝŐŚƚ-line rules. For example, he suggested that 
ƚŚĞĐĞŶƚƌĂůďĂŶŬ ‘ƐŚŽƵůĚďĞĂƵƚŚŽƌŝǌĞĚƚŽƐĞƚĂŶĂƐƐĞƚ-ĞƋƵŝƚǇƌĂƚŝŽĨŽƌĂůůďĂŶŬƐ ?ŝŶŽƌĚĞƌ ‘ƚŽĐŽŶƚĂŝŶ
ƚŚĞ ĚĞƐƚĂďŝůŝǌŝŶŐ ĞĨĨĞĐƚ ŽĨ ďĂŶŬŝŶŐ ? ?154 Although Minsky was writing before HFs, this regulatory 
technique also appears appropriate for HFs, which, like banks, often use short-term debt to finance 
long(er)-term positions in assets. We saw above that an approach along these lines was taken in the 
first proposal for a Directive,155 but was abandoned in the face of lobbying and an international 
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regulatory consensus in favour of less prescriptive rules. A leverage cap would be more likely to 
prevent a systemic crisis because it sets absolute limits to the expansion of ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů,&Ɛ ? leverage, 
and does not rely on discretionary regulation in the face of uncertainty as the primary defence 
against financial instability.  
The problem of uncertainty has not gone unrecognised in academic commentary on HF regulation. 
Romano recognises that ƚŚĞƌĞ ŝƐ  ‘ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂďůĞ ƵŶĐĞƌƚĂŝŶƚǇ ƌĞŐĂƌĚŝŶŐ ŚŽǁ ďĞƐƚ ƚŽ ŵĞĂƐƵƌĞ
institutions ?ĂŶĚŝŶƐƚƌƵŵĞŶƚƐ ?ƌŝƐŬĂŶĚĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶƚŽƐǇƐƚĞŵŝĐƌŝƐŬ ?,156 and that ƚŚŝƐ ‘ĞǆĂĐĞƌďĂƚĞƐƚŚĞ
ƌŝƐŬ ƚŚĂƚ ƌĞŐƵůĂƚŽƌƐ ǁŝůů ŐĞƚ ƚŚŝŶŐƐ ďĂĚůǇ ǁƌŽŶŐ ? ? However, Romano calls for a market solution to 
these difficulties. She argues for greater regulatory diversity, both because it allows for increased 
regulatory arbitrage and therefore more financial innovation, and because regulatory diversity 
hedges against the danger of a single regulator getting it wrong. In contrast, DŝŶƐŬǇ ?Ɛ ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ
suggests that clear, bright-line rules imposing limits on leverage will always be more effective than 
discretionary regulation in dealing with the complexity and uncertainty of the financial system.157  
 
B Regulation of Repo Haircuts 
 
&ŽůůŽǁŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ :ŽŝŶƚ&ŽƌƵŵ ?Ɛ ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚŝŽŶ,158 the FSB has recently set out a framework for minimum 
haircuts in repo markets.159 In light of the reservations about the regulatory scheme expressed 
above, these bright-line rules will be essential to ensuring that HF leverage does not contribute to 
systemic instability.  
 
The framework prescribes numerical floors for haircuts based on the type of security, and in the case 
of debt securities, their maturity.160 It applies to  ‘ŶŽŶ-centrally cleared securities financing 
transactions in which financing against collateral other than government securities is provided to 
entities other than banks and broker-ĚĞĂůĞƌƐ ? ?161 This excludes a number of repo transactions from 
the scope of the framework. It only applies to the provision of repo finance by banks to non-banks, 
such as HFs. Banks which obtain finance through repo are excluded on the basis that they are 
already subject to leverage and liquidity regulation,162 whilst  repo transactions carried out by central 
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banks (which are a key tool of monetary policy) are also excluded. Similarly, haircuts for repo finance 
provided by non-banks to non-banks are also excluded, although the FSB has consulted on this issue. 
The scope of this framework therefore means that it primarily addresses the risks to systemic 
stability through the credit channel, that is, the risk that failure of, for example, a HF borrower, calls 
into question the solvency of a bank. The future treatment of non-bank to non-bank repo haircuts 
will be very important in terms of preventing instability through the market channel. 
 
Equally importantly, the framework also excludes repos collateralised by government securities 
ďĞĐĂƵƐĞ ‘ƉƌŝĐĞŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚƐŝŶƚŚĞƐĞƐĞĐƵƌŝƚŝĞƐŐĞŶĞƌĂůůǇƚĞŶĚŶŽƚƚŽďĞƉƌŽĐǇĐůŝĐĂů ?ĂŶĚ ‘ŚĂŝƌĐƵƚƐŽŶ
these transactions have been comparatively stable over tŝŵĞĂƚǌĞƌŽŽƌůŽǁůĞǀĞůƐ ? ?163 Hence, there 
are no minimum haircuts required on national government bonds, or on bonds issued by the ECB, 
EU, BIS or IMF. Haircuts on government securities are to be determined entirely by the parties to the 
transaction, although the FSB has laid down qualitative standards for assessing haircuts which will 
apply to these securities.164 These qualitative standards should also be used to determine haircuts in 
those repo transactions which are subject to numerical haircut floors, and the &^ ?ƐŝŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶŝƐƚŚĂƚ
the ĨůŽŽƌƐƐŚŽƵůĚŶŽƚďĞĐŽŵĞ ‘de facto market standards ?.165 
 
The framework will certainly impose some limitations on the leverage available to HFs, at least 
where they use non-government securities as collateral for their borrowing. However, HFs still have 
a great deal of room for manoeuvre. With a haircut of 1.5% on a debt security with between one and 
five years to maturity, it is still technically possible to obtain leverage of more than 66 times equity. 
More significantly, the exclusion of government securities dramatically reduces the impact of the 
ĨƌĂŵĞǁŽƌŬ ŽŶ ,&Ɛ P ĂŵŽŶŐ ƚŚĞ ,&Ɛ ƚŚĂƚ ƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞĚ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ & ?Ɛ ůĂƚĞƐƚ ƐƵƌǀĞǇ ? ' ? ? ďŽŶĚƐ ĂƌĞ ƚŚĞ
asset most widely held by HFs, closely followed by listed equities.166 Finally, the exclusion of non-
bank lending means that a whole swathe of the repo market is not affected by this framework. As a 
result, this framework will primarily contribute to ensuring the stability of large banks; any 
regulatory effects on the extent of HF leverage will be indirect. Therefore, the framework is not a 
substitute for a direct cap on leverage, and intervention by national regulators on the basis of the 
information disclosed under the instruments discussed in this article will remain critical to ensuring 
systemic stability. 
 
C Regulation of Remuneration 
While the ŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ ?Ɛ ĨŝƌƐƚƉƌŽƉŽƐĂů ĨŽƌĂŶAIFM Directive did not address remuneration in HFs, 
the enacted Directive does. dŚĞŝƌĞĐƚŝǀĞƌĞŐƵůĂƚĞƐƌĞŵƵŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶŝŶŽƌĚĞƌ ‘ƚŽĂĚĚƌĞƐƐƚŚĞƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůůǇ
detrimental effect of poorly designed remuneration structures on the sound management of risk 
and control of risk-ƚĂŬŝŶŐ ďǇ ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐ ? ?167 ,ĞĚŐĞ ĨƵŶĚ ŵĂŶĂŐĞƌƐ ? ƌĞŵƵŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ ƉŽůŝĐŝĞƐ ŵƵƐƚ ďĞ
 ‘ĐŽŶƐŝƐƚĞŶƚǁŝƚŚĂŶĚƉƌŽŵŽƚĞƐŽƵŶĚĂŶĚĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞƌŝƐŬŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ ? ?ĂŶĚaccord with Annex II to the 
Directive.168 The approach ŝƐ  ‘ĐŽŶƐŝƐƚĞŶƚ ǁŝƚŚ ĂŶĚ ĐŽŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚƐ ? ƚŚĞ ŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ ?Ɛ  ? ? ?
Recommendation on Remuneration Policies in the Financial Sector,169 and substantially replicates 
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Annex I of Capital Requirements Directive III, which ǁĂƐ ƚŚĞ h ?Ɛ ĨŝƌƐƚ ĂƚƚĞŵƉƚ Ăƚ ƌĞŐƵůĂƚŝŶŐ
remuneration in banks.170 
The ŬĞǇƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶ ĨŽƌ ƚŚŝƐĂƌƚŝĐůĞ ŝƐǁŚĞƚŚĞƌ ƚŚĞŝƌĞĐƚŝǀĞ ?ƐƌƵůĞƐŽŶƌĞŵƵŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚĞƚŽ ŝƚƐ
ĂŝŵŽĨ ‘ĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞŵŽŶŝƚŽƌŝŶŐŽĨƐǇƐƚĞŵŝĐƌŝƐŬ ? ?171 The Directive is not explicit as to whether the rules 
on remuneration are merely intended to protect investors in hedge funds against risk-taking which 
exceeds their tolerance and expectations, or whether they are also intended to prevent 
remuneration policies incentivising practices, including particularly the use of leverage, which create 
systemic risk. Certainly, ex ante requirements as to payment in units or shares of the hedge fund 
concerned172 and deferral of variable remuneration173 will align the interests of AIFMs with investors 
in HFs, as will ƚŚĞ ƵƐĞ ŽĨ Ğǆ ƉŽƐƚ  ‘ŵĂůƵƐ Žƌ ĐůĂǁďĂĐŬ ĂƌƌĂŶŐĞŵĞŶƚƐ ? ŝŶ ƚŚĞǀĞŶƚ ŽĨ  ‘ƐƵďĚƵĞĚ Žƌ
ŶĞŐĂƚŝǀĞĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂůƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞ ?.174  
Beyond protecting investors, these rules have a clear micro- rather than macro-prudential focus. 
Annex II seeks to ensure that remuneratioŶ ĚŽĞƐ  ‘not encourage risk-taking which is inconsistent 
with the risk profiles, rules or instruments of incorporation of the AIFs ? ?175 The only provision which 
potentially extends beyond the micro-prudential is the requirement of a comprehensive ex ante 
adjustment mechanism ƚŽĐŽǀĞƌ ‘ĂůůƌĞůĞǀĂŶƚƚǇƉĞƐŽĨĐƵƌƌĞŶƚĂŶĚĨƵƚƵƌĞƌŝƐŬƐ ? ?176 However, in order 
for ex ante adjustments to offer protection against systemic instability, national regulators would 
have to determine whether particular HF pay practices incentivise excessive risk-taking, a second 
order calculation even more difficult than the task they are given in relation to leverage. Coupled 
with an ideologically-ĚƌŝǀĞŶ ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŶŐ ƉƌĞƐƵŵƉƚŝŽŶ ĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ ƌĞŐƵůĂƚŽƌǇ ŝŶƚĞƌĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ǁŝƚŚ  ‘ŵĂƌŬĞƚ
ŽƵƚĐŽŵĞƐ ? ƐƵĐŚ ĂƐ ŝŶĐĞŶtive pay, it seems inconceivable that regulators will intervene in HF pay 
arrangements on the basis that they pose a threat to systemic stability.  
This part of the Directive contrasts sharply with the bright-line, quantitative cap on variable 
remuneration contained in Capital Requirements Directive IV.177 That cap can be justified in terms of 
preventing systemic risk whilst still incentivising some of the risk-taking that is necessary in the 
banking sector.178 The imposition of a similar cap on the variable remuneration of risk-takers in HFs 
could certainly have been justified on the basis of the credit channel, given their close links, through 
prime brokerage and repo markets, with systemically important financial institutions. An argument 
might also be made in relation to preventing systemic risk arising through the market channel. 
However, in the case of HFs, a leverage cap coupled with regulatory oversight would appear to be a 
proportionate response to credit channel concerns, given that, in contrast to banks, only certain 
types of hedge fund use very high levels of leverage.  
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Andenas and Chiu explain the limited scope of these remuneration provisions on the basis that 
 ‘ƌĞŵƵŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƉŽůŝĐŝĞƐŝŶ ?/&DƐ ?ŵĂǇďĞůĞƐƐŽĨĂƐǇƐƚĞŵŝĐŝƐƐƵĞƚŚĂŶŝŶƵŶŝǀĞƌƐĂůďĂŶŬƐĂnd other 
ĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂů ŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐ ? ĂƐ  ?/&D ? ƌĞŵƵŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ ŵĂǇ ďĞ ƐƵďũĞĐƚ ƚŽ ƐŽŵĞ ŝŶǀĞƐƚŽƌ ŽǀĞƌƐŝŐŚƚ ? ? ^ŝŶĐĞ
investors in HFs are professionals, we might expect intervention in the event that those investors 
ƉĞƌĐĞŝǀĞ ƚŚĂƚ ƌĞŵƵŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ ƉŽůŝĐŝĞƐ  ‘ĂĨĨĞĐƚ ŝŶǀĞƐƚŵent returns on the relevant [hedge funds] 
ŵĂŶĂŐĞĚ ? ?179 Likewise, the Joint Forum report suggested that ,&Ɛ ?  ‘ĚĞƐŝƌĞ ƚŽ ĂƚƚƌĂĐƚ ĂŶĚ ƌĞƚĂŝŶ
ŝŶǀĞƐƚŽƌƐ ?would solve ƚŚĞ ‘ƚƌĂĚŝƚŝŽŶĂůƉƌŝŶĐŝƉĂů-ĂŐĞŶƚƉƌŽďůĞŵ ?ŽĨĞǆĐĞƐƐŝǀĞƌŝƐŬ-taking.180  However, 
whilst investors in hedge funds might take a more active approach on remuneration matters than 
dispersed bank shareholders (particularly in light of the recent decline in returns on their 
investments), serious questions remain over whether investors in HFs are able to get a clear picture 
of the impact of remuneration on actual patterns of risk-taking, and whether the preferences of 
individual investors for risk-taking aggregate in a manner which will further systemic stability. The 
more plausible explanation for the limited scope of this provision is that the AIFM Directive became 
law at a time when a cap was simply not on the political agenda. AIFM remuneration is regulated 
almost exactly how policy-makers intended to regulate remuneration in banks before the European 
Parliament intervened in CRD IV. Any proposal for more prescriptive regulation of AIFM 
remuneration would have had to confront the pre-crisis industry and academic orthodoxy that 
hedge funds provide a public good by using leverage to arbitrage and so drive priceƐƚŽƚŚĞŝƌ ‘ĐŽƌƌĞĐƚ ?
levels,181 and then to make a case that that public good is outweighed by the systemic risks they 
pose. The narrow limits of the remuneration rules, then, means that discretionary regulatory 
oversight of leverage is the key mechanism protecting the stability of the financial system against 
threats from excessive leverage. 
 
VI Conclusion 
This article has examined who should regulate HFs and how they should be regulated to ensure that 
they do not create instability in the financial system. It has shown that the EU began the process of 
HF regulation as part of its plans for an integrated capital market. When the financial crisis 
intervened, ƚŚĞ h ďĞŐĂŶ ƚŽ ƚĂŬĞ ŵŽƌĞ ƐĞƌŝŽƵƐůǇ ƚŚĞ ƚŚƌĞĂƚ ƉŽƐĞĚ ďǇ ,&Ɛ ? ƵƐĞ ŽĨ ůĞǀĞƌĂŐĞ, and 
rejected the notion that HF regulation could be left entirely to the individual Member States. As 
enacted, the AIFM Directive sought to strike a balance between, on the one hand, ƚŚĞh< ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚ
in preserving its dominant position as home to the majority of EU-based AIFMs, and on the other, 
the supranational interest in preventing national regulation creating costs for other Member States 
and undermining the stability of EU financial markets. Beyond the EU, it seems likely that most 
jurisdictions will put in place their own systems of HF regulation. However, it should also be 
emphasised that, outside the EU, HF managers are overwhelmingly concentrated in the United 
States, with only limited numbers elsewhere, in jurisdictions such as Switzerland, Singapore and 
Hong Kong. Hence the EU and the US will remain the most important jurisdictions regulating HFs. 
Although it seems very unlikely that a global scheme regulating HF managers will be put in place, 
there is likely to be considerable de facto convergence of regulation. Most importantly, non-EU 
jurisdictions are, like the EU, likely to follow the G20 recommendations. In addition, the AIFM 
Directive may itself create a degree of pressure for convergence, because a non-EU AIFM can only 
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obtain an EU-ǁŝĚĞƉĂƐƐƉŽƌƚǁŚĞƌĞ ‘ESMA considers that there are no significant obstacles regarding 
investor protection, market disruption, competition and the monitoring of systemic risk ? ?182 Until 
ESMA is satisfied with the non-EU regulatory regime, non-EU AIFMs will have to incur the costs of 
seeking seek authorisation in individual Member States. 
In terms of how HFs should be regulated, the article has shown that the AIFM Directive will give 
regulators a much clearer view of the leverage used by HFs, and that, if adopted, the SFT Regulation 
will give regulators a much better idea of the size and concentration of the repo markets. Both of 
these instruments are therefore to be welcomed. However, it has been argued that the threat posed 
ƚŽ ƐǇƐƚĞŵŝĐ ƐƚĂďŝůŝƚǇ ďǇ ,&Ɛ ? ƵƐĞ ŽĨ ůĞǀĞƌĂŐĞ ĐĂŶŶŽƚ ďĞ ƌĞĚƵĐĞĚ ƚŽ Ăn information asymmetry 
between regulators and AIFMs. The fundamental uncertainty about the future evolution of the 
financial system means that, in relying on discretionary intervention, the AIFM Directive gives 
regulators the impossible task of identifying when the use and concentration of leverage threatens 
systemic stability through the credit and market channels. A set of financing arrangements which 
looked safe under one set of assumptions about the future can suddenly look very risky as soon as 
those assumptions change. /ƚŚĂƐƐŚŽǁŶƚŚĂƚ ?ƌĞŐƌĞƚƚĂďůǇ ?ƚŚĞŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ ?ƐĨŝƌƐƚƉƌŽŽƐĂůĨŽƌĂĐĂƉ
on leverage was defeated by a combination of lobbying and an emergent international consensus 
that the financial crisis did not require a radical change in approach to the regulation of financial 
markets. In relying in information disclosure and discretionary regulation, rather than bright-line 
rules, the instruments considered here do not represent a paradigm shift in regulatory strategy. The 
operating assumption is still that financial markets are self-correcting, with regulatory intervention 
only justifiable where regulators can point to a clear market failure. The Minskyan perspective 
adopted in this article suggests that the evolution of financial markets is fundamentally uncertain, 
which is important because it makes it impossible for regulators to provide any objective evidence of 
market failure. Given the powerful political pressures at play, interventions will be, at most, 
extremely rare, and so there is no ƌĞĂƐŽŶ ƚŽ ďĞ ĐŽŶĨŝĚĞŶƚ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ h ?Ɛ ƐĐŚĞŵĞ ǁŝůů ƉƌĞǀĞŶƚ,&Ɛ
contributing to systemic instability in the future.183 
In concluding, it is suggested that the fundamental uncertainty of financial markets should be taken 
more seriously in designing regulation. MŝŶƐŬǇ ?ƐƉĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞƐĂƌĞvalid and relevant far beyond the 
narrow field of hedge fund regulation. They can potentially also offer insights on other topical issues 
in financial regulation for systemic stability, such as bank capital requirements, limits on mortgage 
lending and the possible regulation of other institutional investors. 
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recommended that AIFMs based in Switzerland, Guernsey and Jersey should have access to the AIFM passport. 
See ESMA,  ‘ESMA's advice to the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission on the application of 
the AIFMD passport to non-EU AIFMs and AIFs ? ?^D ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?:ƵůǇ ? ? ? ? ?/ƚƌĞŵĂŝŶƐƚŽďĞƐĞĞŶŚŽw the 
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ĨƌĞĞǌĞƐĂǇŵĂŶ/ƐůĂŶĚŚĞĚŐĞĨƵŶĚƐŽƵƚ ? ?Financial Times, 2nd August 2015. 
183
 The regulation of HFs will continue to evolve. A recent consultation by the FSB and IOSCO proposed that 
large HFs with net assets under management of USD 100bn as well as those with gross notional exposure to 
derivatives of USD 400bn should be considered Global Systemically Important Financial Institutions (G-SIFIs). 
See FSB/OICV-IOSCO, Consultative Document (2
nd
) Assessment Methodologies for Identifying Non-Bank Non-
Insurer Global Systemically Important Financial Institutions  ? Proposed High-Level Framework and Specific 
Methodologies, 4
th
 March 2015, 35-6. Whilst this consultation does not propose any policy measures which 
will apply to G-SIFIs, the post-crisis international consensus mapped out in this article suggests that any 
macroprudential oversight is likely to take the form of discretionary regulation. 
